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This thesis contains a study of International Radio
Spectrum Allocation and Regulation with particular emphasis
upon the U.S.'s relationship with the International Telecom-
munications Union. (ITU), The authors develop a model of the
technical, political and economic aspects of the radio spectrum
allocation and regulation processes. The principal elements
of the model concern the benefits of use, increased demand,
cost of technical expansion, technological advances and the
decision making process of the international regulatory body.
In particular, a significant amount of attention is directed
toward the historical development of the ITU and spectrum
allocation within the framework of the authors' model. Con-
cluding work focuses on the use of the model to determine
possible U.S. courses of action with respect to future World
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1906 international radio frequency management has been
carried out by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
Over the years this organization has developed spectrum alloca-
tions and procedures through its Administrative Conferences, The
results of each Administrative Conference have great impact upon
the future technology, economics and politics of member nations.
The next scheduled Conference is to be held in Geneva in October
1979* The authors have attempted to model the process by which
the frequency spectrum is managed. The model is introduced in
Chapter II along with a description of the characteristics of
the spectrum it regulates. Chapter III presents the historical
basis for the model and Chapter IV contains a description of
the environment within which it must function. Utilizing the
model, Chapter V presents some specific allocation alternatives
and possible methods of modifying future outcomes. An Appendix
is included to describe the organization of the ITU and the
method of preparations for a World Administrative Radio Con-
ference (WARC),

II. THE -RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION MODEL
The International management of the radio-frequency spectrum
has become one of the most complex and frustrating problems
facing the world community. Like water and fire, the benefits
of the spectrum are heralded by all. But also, as water and
fire, it's uncontrolled usage is counterproductive. It is the
opinion of the authors that regulation of the spectrum in some
form is a necessity. The more scarce this resource becomes the
more important regulation becomes.
Regulation can take different forms. The traditional form
of the International Regulatory Body is used here since it is
the present method of spectrum allocation. In an attempt to
model this process, we have started with the simple supply and
demand relationship and have added the cause and effect inter-
play of technology, economics and politics. It is the contin-
uous interplay of these factors that has shaped and reshaped
the radio spectrum through the years.
The underlying premise for the model is that the radio
spectrum exhibits many aspects of a "collective good". As
such the spectrum is not beneficial to a single user.
"Collective goods" are collectively consumed and limitations
on use are difficult. Because of these characteristics, when
the spectrum is available to two or more users it is available
to all. The only requirement is to have the necessary equip-
ment. Also in accordance with "collective good" theories, the
additional users do not increase the marginal cost of spectrum
8

availability. A large number of users can however increase the
marginal cost to individual users through interference. It is
therefore essential to the effective use of the spectrum to have
mutually agreed upon frequencies and at least an implied if not
actual network concept available. In other words the benefits
of effective spectrum usage accrue from agreed upon usages for
specific frequencies and non interference of uses.
A. THE MODEL
To construct the Radio Frequency Allocation Model, we start
with the finite amount of spectrum available for use. Some
portions of the spectrum have numerous uses while other portions
have very few. It is reasonable to assume that demand for the
portions of spectrum with many possible uses would be high and
demand for the less usable portion would be small. The large
demand tends to cause saturation and inefficiencies at various
spectrum locations. It also stimulates technological advances
to alleviate the saturation. Continued expansion of the spectrum
provides new uses and some substitutibility for older uses. As
demand continues to grow, technological advances will expand
supply, but at a slower rate and increased cost. As cost in-
creases it becomes more economical to modify existing portions
of spectrum so that it is available to more users. The logical
progression leads to a spectrum that is saturated, with further
expansion costs prohibitive to most users.
International Regulation attempts to control this spiral
by a more equitable allocation scheme and a reduction of asso-
ciated technological costs, through the combined political

effort of its members. This is accomplished by arriving at an
agreed upon consensus for procedures and allocation through
international conferences. It also introduces the additional
factors of political action, international negotiation and
bureaucratic sluggishness. As the system functions, historical
precedents have a significant effect upon allocation. Most of
the factors noted previously do not compliment each other.
Each adds its own complexity to the model. With some factors
diametrically opposed there can be no ideal solution. The
optimal solution is one that provides the most benefits to the
most people at the least cost.
The outputs of the model are the allocation decisions.
Any output will provide some benefits to the constituent com-
munity and also associated costs. Increased benefits can tend
to further increase demand by creating new inputs. Increased
costs associated with allocation decisions tend to decrease
the marginal cost of expanding or modifying the spectrum. This
further modifies the input process, stimulating the technol-
ogical and regulatory action. Figure QlJ depicts the
Functional Radio- frequency Spectrum Regulatory Model constructed
by the authors.
Three characteristics of the model should be addressed
further. First, is the model in equilibrium; second, does the
model exhibit stability and third, can the model be equalized?
The first characteristic is equilibrium. It is the authors'
opinion that if the model is in equilibrium there must be an
equalization of the costs associated with the input paths. In
































to the cost of political or regulatory action for all partici-
pants. If that condition exists, it should not matter which
path is chosen. In effect the outputs would satisfy the in-
creased demand and the model would be in equilibrium. This is
not however, the present situation. The views stated in Chapter
IV by the U.S.'s ambassadors demonstrate clearly that the U.S.
does not look upon the two input paths as having equal costs.
The U.S. position historically, as stated in Chapters II and
IV, has been a preference for the technological path. The
remainder of the participants have, on the other hand, shown a
proclivity toward the political path since its cost to them is
significantly less than the technological path. These inequal-
ities are discussed further in Chapter IV. Eased on our re-
search, the authors are of the opinion that the model is not in
equilibrium.
The second question is, does the model exhibit stability?
That is, does the model tend toward equilibrium through its
processes and does the functioning of the model over time tend
to equalize the technological and political costs. The question
is complex because it is dependent upon the internal and
external factors that affect the model. The authors' view is
that if the external factors are ignored and the internal
factors are stable then, theoretically, the model will tend
toward equilibrium. The internal factors include the structure
of the ITU, economic conditions in each nation, political
ideology of individual participants and negotiation strategies.
If these were stable, over time a clear consensus would emerge
which would tend to move the model toward an equilibrium point.
12

This equilibrium point would be a function of the final mix of
the above factors. These factors are discussed further in
Chapter IV #
The external factors noted above are those events that
occur exclusive of the model that affect its function. Both
World Wars were such events. As discussed in Chapter II, his-
torically these external factors have pushed the model away
from equilibrium by causing imbalances- in the costs associated
with both input paths. Both World Wars and the space program
in the U.S. created communications related technological ad-
vances that made the technological path more attractive than
the political. Using the above assumption the authors perceive
the model as tending toward an equilibrium at any given time.
It is also our opinion that in the real world since the internal
factors are not stable the equilibrium point itself changes.
In effect the process "hunts" for this equilibrium point over
time until an external factor pushes it significantly out of
balance again so that equilibrium is always out of reach.
The third question is can the model be equalized? In other
words can the model be forced closer to equilibrium? In the
view of the authors there are methods that will move the model
toward equilibrium. Alternatives to accomplish this in the
specific areas of HF and satellite bands are presented in
Chapter V.
3. THE FREQUENCY SPECTRUM AS A NATURAL RESOURCE
Of the entire range of frequencies that constitute the
electro magnetic spectrum, only that portion from about 10
kilo-hertz (kHz) to 3 billion kilo-hertz is classified as the
13

radio spectrum. This spectrum is a natural resource, just as
are coal, water or air. It is similar to air and water in that
it is susceptible to oversubscription and pollution. The world
has become highly dependent upon the electro-magnetic spectrum
in recent years, primarily in the field of telecommunications
and automated data processing but also for such electronic
conveniences as micro-wave ovens, automatic garage door openers
and radio controlled models. Presently, except for some exper-
imentation, only that portion of the spectrum from 10 kHz to
275 GHz (275 x 1o"hz) can be utilized. This comprises only 9,2
percent of the radio spectrum!^6,p, 1 8j This simple statistic
makes it obvious that use of the radio spectrum is not simply a
matter of building a piece of equipment to operate at an unused
frequency.
In technological terms the natural resource of the radio
spectrum as we know it has finite limitations. It is not
elastic. Frequencies used to represent channels of communication
are not just numbers which may be divided into smaller numbers
without limit. Each radio operation requires a finite portion
of the spectrum - a channel or traffic lane - in time and space.
The spectrum is not flexible. Certain operations can be per-
formed only by using specific frequency ranges. All parts of the
spectrum cannot be substituted for all other parts because of
propagation, atmospheric and bandwidth characteristics, For
example high frequencies (3 to 30 MHz) are useful for low capa-
city long range circuits but are inadequate for high capacity
circuits such as televisionJ^-j p,A-6J
U

The radio spectrum also has usage limitations. It does not
follow national boundaries. The interference range of radio
signals is much greater than their useful range, and uses must
be coordinated and the spectrum shared among nations. As a
natural resource the radio spectrum is unique. It cannot be
exhausted through use or worn out; but careless or inefficient
use can contaminate it and can prevent its maximum benefits
from being obtained.
As with any valuable resource, the radio spectrum has been
developed in relation to its supply and demand. The demand for
radio spectrum increases yearly because it offers an instane-
ous and direct way of communicating across space. Modern
decision makers in government and business are dependent upon
the transmission of voice, data and the printed word. It has
become absolutely essential to the safety of air and sea travel,
and to the command and control structure of the United States
and other developed countries.r54>P»A-1J It also reflects growth
in levels of population and per capita income and individual/
group preferences. This burgeoning demand also has associated
problems or costs that must be borne by the transmitter and
recipient, private or public, the governments of the world,
policy makers, equipment manufacturers and those who are con-
cerned with the content of the information rather than the
technology by which it is transmitted.]^, p.xnv] On the supply
side technical advances have improved the use of spectrum along
its dimensions of time, space, and frequency. At the same time
other technological advances are making it possible to use




The Radio Frequency Allocation Model is derived from the
historical interplay of technological and international polit-
ical factors. This Chapter discusses the historical patterns
that have contributed to the model. The history is divided
into three sections, each representing- a different stage of
development. The first stage from 1906 to 1957 was the period
in which the technological path of the model developed and
became dominant. The period 1957 to 1971 was a transition
stage during which the political path developed and began to
compete with the technological path. The final stage from 1971
to the present has been a period in which the political path
has begun to emerge as the dominant path of the model. The last
section summarizes the historical development of the model.
A. 1906 TO 1957
The first International Conference on Radio was held at
Berlin in 1906. It was attended by twenty-seven nations. The
purpose of the conference was to "facilitate maritime intercom-
munication by obligatory intercommunication between stations
using different equipment".^ 6, p. 26j The U.S. governments posi-
tion as stated in the delegations instructions was that the
conference was for technical and practical recommendations
that could be reviewed and acted upon by government agencies at
some later date.fi 6, p.26j This approach was markedly different
from that of the other conferees. These conferees were em-
powered to act as plenipotentiaries directly answering for
16

their governments. Reference 16 notes that Americans were looked
upon as novices in the international arena during this period
while Great Britain was looked upon as the leader. This was
only natural since most of the telecommunications interests
available internationally were owned by the British Marconi
Company. The conference was dominated by the opposing views of
the British and American delegations. The British, arguing from
economic and political interests, wanted restrictions on the in-
terchange of telegrams and radio-messages at sea. This would
have allowed the British Marconi Company to maintain its near
monopoly in this field and also would have maintained Great
Britain as the prime influence in the future of telecommunica-
tions. The British backed restrictions would have stifled
innovation by placing almost insurmountable barriers to entry on
the industry.^ 6, p. 27J Their position was, "that different
systems of radio-telegraphy are not always able to communicate
effectively one with the other.
"[] 6, P.28J The American delega-
tion, having prepared for a technical conference was in a good
position to oppose the British. First, this period in the U.S.
was marked by much government discussion of the new telecommun-
ications industry
.|1 6, p. 28J There was a great amount of concern
that this new industry might fall prey to monopolistic inter-
ests as had happened to the telephone; American Telephone and
Telegraph was presenting arguments similar to the British in
an attempt to preserve their interests. As in the domestic
telephone industry, it could be demonstrated that different
systems could be used effectively without affecting the quality
of transmission; in fact, the quality in some cases was
17

enhanced.jj 6,p.27J Secondly the U.S. was determined to forge a
cooperative stance with the other nations of the world. The
interchanging of messages between systems was seen as a method
of furthering internationalism. After long and bitter debate
the American view was accepted, allowing for interchange of
messages. The frequencies 500 kHz and 1,000 kHz were allocated
as the first general public service frequencies. (SHIP/SHORE).
|^2f, p.B-2j It is the authors 1 opinion that for the U.S. the
decision was politically, economically and technically sound.
It also catapulted the U.S. into a leadership role in the
telecommunications field. Also of note at the first conference
were two little debated decisions that were accepted unanimously-
the designation of Morse SOS as the international distress sig-
nal and the formation of a central depository for technical
telecommunications data available worldwide.
The second International Radio Conference was held at
London in 191 2.Q6,p.32J The U.S. delegation was the dominant
factor at the conference. It was assumed, even prior to the
meetings, that the technical suggestions made in London would be
accepted by the conferees. In fact pending domestic radio
legislation, the Ship Act amendment and the Radio Act amendment,
already contained the U.S. proposals as part of their provi-
sions. |T 6, p. 33J
It was commonly believed at that time that only the lower
portion of the radio spectrum was usable for communications.
United States proposals for sharing the spectrum (150 kHz to
1,000 kHz) were quickly accepted. While not formalized in
writing the allocations were :J5if, p.B-3J
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A. below 200 kHz - long distance point to point
B. 375-550 kHz - ship - shore working frequencies
C. 550-600 kHz - broadcasting
D. 600-1,000 kHz - shared among broadcasting, ship/shore
and experimental purposes.
The 1912 conference provided little controversy among the
forty-three nations present.!? 6, p.33 The United States was
recognized as the economic and political leader on the inter-
national scene, thus, the next conference was set for 1917 in
Washington D.C.
This leadership in communications matters was aided by the
technological advances made by the entrepreneurs of the U.S.
The single most important invention was Fessenden's heterodyne
transceiver. By mixing two frequencies, one at local oscil-
lation and the other much higher, a third frequency was created
for transmission. In the receiver the mixing action again re-
stored the local frequency. This breakthrough coupled with
DeForest's triode demonstrated that higher frequencies could be
modulated with voice signals and transmitted. Thus the spectrum
limits were extensively expanded. [2, p» 89
The authors' opinion is that V/orld War I was devastating
in its impact upon the world community. Political and economic
chaos were the order of the day in Europe. Technology, how-
ever, flourished as nations attempted to gain strategic or
tactical advantage. The U.S. Navy was one of the pioneers
conducting extensive radio frequency experiments and utilizing
radio transmissions for tactical purposesA3
,
p. 1 9j The Germans
and British did the same. Since all ship/shore equipments
19

were grouped in a narrow band, interference was common and
added more emphasis to the need for spectrum expansion.
The conclusion of the War was marked by a new spirit of
internationalism and cooperation.^, p«34j Preliminary allocation
conferences were held among the Allies starting in 1919 and a
full conference was scheduled for 1927 in Washington D. C. At
the very first post war meeting a proposal was submitted rec-
ommending that allocation of frequencies to radio services be
discarded as a principle and that frequencies be allocated to
countries. It is of interest that while the proposal was dis-
missed it was to be considered again in the future
.Uf3, P^O^
3y the time the seventy-nine nations convened the Washing-
ton Conference, radio stations and uses were proliferating
throughout the usable spectrum. Broadcasting was operating at
up to 1,500 kHz. In the period of 1922-24 alone, the number
of broadcasting stations increased from 30 to 5OO.I33, p.540__
This new utilization of spectrum space also led to substantial
profits that would bring economic pressures upon future spectrum
allocations. Additionally, radio amateurs were firmly en-
trenched at several points in the spectrum as was the Navy,
Army and some private corporations, notably Bell and ECA.J50, ^104
The above interests succeeded in pressuring the government
to protect existing services at the Conference. New alloca-
tions were interlaced into slots on the allocation table. The
technical expertise belonged to the private corporations.
Arguing from both an economic viewpoint (major changes in
existing services would cost large sums of capital in equipment
modifications) and from a technical view (the services are
20

operating at efficient points on the spectrum) the private
sector influenced directly the U.S. proposals and therefore the
international allocations,]^, p,V7j In an attempt to provide a
more orderly utilization of the spectrum in the future, the con-
ference allocated frequencies up to 23 MHz even though actual
usage was only up to 18 MHz,Uf3,p.2lJ Even more significant,
an international technical agency known as the Consultative
Committee on International Radio (CCIR) was established to cope
with future technical problems.[50,?, 105j
The period following the 1927 conference witnessed a rapid
growth of all existing services, both in extent and in technical
perfection. The development of new services, and the opening
of new frequency bands in the region above 30 MHz followed.
Navigational aids, aeronautical communications, land mobile,
and television broadcasting services came into being or were
under development, 3y 1930 round-the-world broadcasting was
effected,|33, p,5^0'
The next major International Conference was to be held at
Madrid in 1932, Although investment capital was scarce in the
U,S, due to the depression, the communications market outlook
was more optimistic. In 1931 NBC reported net profits of
$2, 325, 229 and CBS $2, 3^6,766, NBC offered 61 stations coast
to coast while CBS offered 79, 13, p,250j During that same year
Britain went off the gold standard, 325 American banks closed
in September of 1931 and 522 closed in October, The following
year, 1932, as the depression deepened and unemployment rose,
NBC still reported a net profit of $1,050,113 and CBS
S1 ,623,251 ,1*3, p, 252"] The population could not afford dinner
21

out or movies and so they turned to the radio. The broadcast
industry flourished. The new economic power of the industry
converted readily to political power in communications matters.
The broadcasters main concern was the same as the other partic-
ipating nations; namely the uses of the spectrum were expanding
so rapidly that additional wavelengths were needed.
The first order of business at Madrid was to merge the
previously enacted International Telegraph Convention and
International Radiotelegraph Convention, into a new organization,
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) with head-
quarters in Berne, Switzerland. Thus an international organ-
ization was born to allocate the radio spectrum and to forge
cooperation among the nations of the world. The organization
of the ITU is discussed in detail in appendix A.
The next order of business was the expansion of the broad-
casting allocation. Internally, U.S. interests were divided.
The radio and electronic component companies had realized
through experience and economies of scale that spectrum ex-
pansion into adjacent areas would require the least modifica-
tions and provide the most economic benefits.!! 6jP«76J The Hadio
manufacturers association ignoring cost, argued that use of
lower frequencies would improve reception. This was countered
by the Bell Labs contention that longer waves (lower frequen-
cies) would mean new receivers would be necessary at higher
cost with a relatively small increase in quality.li 6, p. 76) It
was an understandable argument since Bell wanted these fre-
quencies for its newly instituted transatlantic telephone
operations JpO, p. 69] At the higher end the Maritime interests,
22

citing their own needs for frequencies, were adamantly against
giving up part of their present band to broadcasting. The
government, recognizing the conflicting views of these powerful
domestic interests, opted for very minor changes to the existing
spectrum allocations, preferring that modifications could be
made internally and outside of the international arena. This
was a logical domestic political course since new communication
legislation was pending in Congress. (Communications Act of
1934)jT6,p.8l]
The Madrid conference made minor changes to the 1927
allocations and allotted additional frequencies up to 30 MHz
due primarily to the lack of U.S. support for more comprehensive
changes.
The period between 1932 and the 1938 Cairo conference was
marked by continued advances in technology. In 1933
Alexanderson developed frequency modulation in an attempt to
reduce noise and interference in the high frequency bands.
While this was a significant improvement, the commercial broad-
cast interests failed to capitalize on it because of the neces-
sary high cost design changes to transmitters and receivers.
J33,p«541j It was not until late in the decade, after
Alexanderson' s concepts had been tested commercially that this
concept was fully embraced by broadcasting. Additional advances
in coaxial cable made it possible for AT&T to transmit many
phone conversations on a single line without interference«33, ?343j
This eased the pressure on the spectrum in general and broad-
casting in particular. Television and Radar research was also




The Cairo Conference, known also as the second ITU Confer-
ence, was held in 1938 with eighty countries attending.|26,p.82j
The purpose of the conference was to further tighten the ex-
isting rules for allocation of frequencies Jl 6, P.83J There was
an increasing demand for additional radio frequencies due to a
rapid expansion of the mobile, fixed, and broadcasting services.
The growing saturation of spectrum made it increasingly impor-
tant to make the most economical use possible of the facil-
ities and to reconsider the Madrid Allocations.
The Cairo conference approved extensions of the frequency
spectrum, blocking in allocations up to 300 MHz for future
useJ^Zf, p.B-Q The U.S. delegation approached this conference
with the idea that sound proposals would lay the ground work
for future allocations. These allocations could then be meshed
into the Allocation Table with minimum debate. In the authors 1
view this made good technical and economic sense since the U.S.
was dealing from a position of strength. Technologically the
U.S. was significantly ahead of the other members of the ITU in
the development of more powerful and efficient electronic
equipment. As the U.S. began to emerge from the depression
period, large amounts of investment capital became available
to the communications industry .11 6j p» 8i+j An example of this U.S.
approach was its recognition of the future importance of air-
craft. Even though the aircraft industry was still in its
infancy the U.S. sucessfully sponsored allocations for the




Prior to the Cairo conference the U.S. had called a series
of regional conferences and alleviated allocation problems, so
that when the main conference convened the V/estern Hemisphere
presented a united front while the Europeans continued to be
split over the future uses of the spectrum. The logical result
was that the U.S. dominated the Cairo conference.il 6, p.87j
World War II, starting in 1939} brought forth new uses of
the spectrum such as radar, great expansion in aviation with its
need for instantaneous and reliable global communication, vast
use of mobile two-way radio, FM/TV broadcasting and microwave
radio relay. The U.S. military alone had a functional alloca-
tion plan up to 30,000 MHz.J54jP.B-i] New uses of VHF and UHF
became established immediately upon the advent of technical
means to generate, radiate, and receive higher and higher
frequencies. Thus many services became established at a time
when it was not known whether the particular frequency band
adopted was best suited for the service, and large investments
in facilities which followed would make it difficult to con-
sider reassignment s on a more efficient basis. Furthermore,
the importance of a new service could not be accurately pre-
dicted, and therefore its share of spectrum space had to be
estimated in inexact terms.
Several shifts in allocations within the U.S. were made
between 1938 and 19A-5* For example, when the time came i:o
allocate bands for television service, in replacement for those
which had originally been set out prior to the war, it was
found to be impossible to provide for all the requirements in
25

one continuous band located where the best radio-propagation
conditions for television exist. This was because of the al-
ready widely established uses by other important services, such
as aids to air navigation.hf3jP«233
With the conclusion of the War in 19^5 it became apparent
that international coordination would be necessary to cope with
the many expanding services and the international disorder in
the recording of radio- frequency assignments. To resolve these
matters an International Conference was convened at Atlantic
City, New Jersey in 1947« "This conference was dominated by the
victorious allies.p 6jP«9j They did not agree on all proposals,
but for the most part worked well together.!] 6, p.92j The re-
organization of the ITU was an important item on the agenda.
This work was expedited by the U.S. Department of State cir-
culating its preliminary proposals to other members prior to
the conference.
The Soviet proposals for ITU reorganization were practically
a copy of the American proposals. All five allies felt the
remodeled ITU should have an Administrative Council and a
permanent Secretariat. A Central Frequency Regulation Board
(CFR3) was a distinctive U.S. proposal. Up to that time the
Berne Bureau was publishing a frequency list which was compiled
simply by countries notifying the Bureau of the use of a spe-
cific frequency. The Bureau had no powers, but served merely as
a registry of fice.n6,p.93~) Conflicts of prior clearance of
frequencies would be resolved by the new board.
Resolution of the spectrum allocation problems was achieved
through compromise, but the final results contained the basic
26

United States* proposals. Some controversial issues were
bypassed and left for future special conferences. For example,
the U.S. and the rest of the Western Hemisphere wanted a maximum
allocation for amateurs, but the European powers wanted only a
minimum number of amateur bands. The final result was a loss
of some existing allocations in the old band but a gain in a
new and wider band in another part of the spectrum. ll 6, p.93J
The principle of regionalization was accepted at the con-
ference, dividing the world into three regions.
In an effort to implement the Atlantic City frequency-
allocation plan, many international meetings were held. The
Provisional Frequency Board was in session for over two years,
commencing in 1948. The Eoard failed to produce an acceptable
frequency assignment list, because it could not resolve the
conflicting requirements of members. The countries of the world
generally submitted requirements, including needs for the
future, in excess of the capacity of the pertinent parts of the
frequency spectrum to accommodate themJ43, P«24J
Two conferences were held in 1949 and 1950 to prepare a
plan for frequency assignments for HF broadcasting stations.
These conferences also failed to agree on acceptable arrange-
ments. An International Administrative Aeronautical Radio
Conference met in 1948 and 1949 and adopted a plan for aviation
which, however, could not be made effective unless there was an
acceptable international solution of the assignment problem for




Meanwhile, disturbed world conditions initiated by the war
in Korea, followed by the mobilization activities of many im-
portant countries, intervened, and imposed restrictions on
effective international collaboration in telecommunications.
Furthermore, because of the unprecedented growth of some ser-
vices, particularly international broadcasting with its psy-
chological warfare aspects, many countries of the world found
it expedient to ignore the international agreements already in
effect and assign stations to frequencies outside the inter-
nationally allocated bands. The Extraordinary Administrative
Radio Conference which began its meeting in August 1951} was
not able to carry out its originally contemplated mission of
approving a new complete master list of frequency assignments
because of the failure of the Provisional Frequency Board to
produce acceptable frequency lists for the fixed and broad-
casting services. Instead the conference found its activities
limited chiefly to such agreements as could be reached for
promoting evolutionary procedures for putting the fixed and
broadcasting stations in the frequency bands allocated to those
services at Atlantic City. It did however, approve planned
frequency assignments for the aeronautical and maritime
services.E.3,p.2i+]
In the United States much progress was made, meanwhile,
in the allocation of frequency bands and the assignment of
frequencies to stations in the spectrum above 30 MHz, par-
ticularly in the fields of television and land mobile services.
It proved impossible to give the new services the frequencies
best suited for them even for those cases where the
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characteristics of the applicable frequencies and equipment
technology were relatively well understood,Uf3jP»25|
B. 1957 TO 1971
In the interests of a more orderly allocation of the spec-
trum, a bureacracy had been created in 1947. The new organization
made it easier for smaller, lesser developed countries to have
a say in spectrum allocation, a democratic idea. At the same
time it is the view of the authors' that the additional number
of voices would tend to dilute the developed countries 1 (most
notably the U.S.) power at future conferences.
The secondary impact may have been even more significant
to the future of telecommunications. The countries of the
world were provided with assistance and technical knowledge by
the ITU through its consultative committees. Thus options
previously not available to lesser developed countries became
usable. The period following World War II marked the beginning
of the end for colonialism [30, p, 3 \J Sach year more independent
countries emerged. Colonialism gave way to spheres of influ-
ence as the East and West vied for leverage in the Third World,
Most of the newly emerging nations had very little in the way
of economic or political bases. Their nationalistic zeal to
catch up and thrust themselves into the twentieth century
caused them to align themselves economically and sometimes
politically in one or the other of the major spheres. Inter-
national markets are a necessity for lesser developed countries,
both to buy needed commodities and to sell their own products.
To compete efficiently in these markets, adequate telecommuni-
cations are essential. Telecommunications can also be used
29

to inform, and to some extent control, the populace. These
uses illustrate that telecommunications is a powerful tool for
governments of lesser developed countries. It is the view of
the authors that the period of the fifties saw more and more
nations use this tool.
With the above underlying it, the decade of the fifties
was a period of economic and technological growth. Space,
television and microwave systems became operational. At the
same time the major countries had significant success in shifting
frequencies for various services to more efficient blocks of
spectrum in accordance with the 1947 allocation table,(43,p.25J
Several small regional and specialized conferences were held to
more efficiently allocate and use the spectrum. These included
the Maritime VHF Conference in 1957 and the European Broad-
casting Area Conference of 1961 •[43>P«25/
A Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU was held at Geneva
in 1 959* Concurrently an Administrative Radio Conference
adopted Regulations under which the useable spectrum was con-
sidered as extending to A-0,000 MHz.jif3, p.26J
At the 1959 conference the Lesser Developed Countries
obtained an increase in the number of members assigned to the
ITU's Administrative Council from 18 to 25. r7jP- 1 |] The in-
crease was a concession to the LDC's call for more represen-
tation in the allocation process. The vacancies were filled
with four delegates from the African Region and one each from
Asia, Australia and Europe, Also added to Article 4 of the
ITU's "Purposes of the Union" was a statement that in the
future, "...it (ITU) would foster the creation, development
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and improvement of telecommunications equipment and networks in
new or developing countries by every means at its disposal,
especially its participation in the appropriate programmes of
the United Nations. " (_6, p. 13] These Third V/orld stirrings
prompted the American delegate to comment that, "..the tremen-
dous interest of the new and developing countries in technical
assistance.. . was the most significant single trend noted at
the conference." [6, p. 1M
As an outgrowth of the IFRB's work during the fifties the
1959 Conference strengthened the Board's procedures for re-
cording frequency assignments of which it received notice.W3,p27
J
Its review would now include an investigation of existing all-
ocations and possible interference with other users. The
Geneva Conference of 1959 marked the first time that recognition
was given to the fact that portions of the spectrum were be-
coming saturated, most notably the
*t to 27 MHz HF band. A
special panel was established to study the problem, and its
final report listed 38 recommendations to reduce congestion.
[Th3 } p.26J Most of the recommendations of the ITU HF panel have
been implemented; unused or seldom used point to point and
broadcast circuits have been terminated, many operations have
been converted to single sideband (SSB), more high-capacity
submarine cables have been brought into use on a number of
routes, greater use is being made of directive antennas, and
communications satellites were studied for use^3>P»27j
Most of these recommendations were implemented by the devel-
oped nations of the world to accommodate the lesser developed
countries' HF needs. At the conclusion of the 1959 Conference
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the U.S. delegate filed these reassuring words in his final
report.
The Conference provided the opportunity to advance
with representatives of other countries the position
and point of view of the United States on International
Telecommunications questions generally and to encourage
full understanding and friendly cooperation between the
participating countries. It is believed that the col-
laboration between the United States and other countries
maintained the best traditions of the ITU in its long
record of International cooperation and accomplishment J7, p. 1 6]
To the authors' knowledge this was the last such optimistic
report filed by a U.S. delegate to an ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference.
In 1957 the space age and satellite era began with the
launch of SPUTNIK
«J57, p. 86j It began in a spirit of cooperation.
The first satellite system designs were low altitude, random
orbit satellites,]^, p.2f8| This type of system required thirty
to forty satellites for full global coverage, each of which
would be used at different times by different sets of earth
stations around the world. Each earth station would require
multiple, fully tracking antennas in order to establish com-
munications links through successive satellites as they came
into view, while maintaining links through satellites passing
from view. To establish multiplicity of links among many
nations would require complex scheduling of satellites, onboard
radio repeaters, and earth stations. The complexity and cost
envisaged for such a system, plus the fact that any one sat-
ellite would be of use to a particular nation for only a small
percentage of time, led to the conclusion that the financing
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and use of a communications satellite system would require
global participation.p4,P«49j Accordingly in 19&3, tne Inter-
national Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, later called
INTELSAT was formed to develop a single global system of inter-
national satellite communications.
One of the political and economic realities of that period
was the heavy investment made by European countries in cable
systems^/f ,p./f6/ Because they viewed the satellite systems as
a threat to this investment, the Europeans procrastinated,
possibly hoping a new generation of cables would make the
question moot. Interestingly, it was satellite technology that
overtook the new consortium. Before the final agreements were
signed, the geostationary orbiting satellites became opera-
tional, with significant advantages. One satellite could cover
forty percent of the globe, reducing a worldwide system to
three satellites.]^, p. 27J Other operational advantages of the
geostationary configuration are of note. It soon became ap-
parent that the. fixed location and orientation of such sat-
ellites in relation to the earth's surface would permit the use
of directive antennas, capable of producing more powerful
illumination of the earth from the limited power capability.
This antenna directivity would not have been useful with con-
tinuously orbiting unoriented satellites. Also the geosta-
tionary configuration rendered frequency sharing between earth
stations and terrestrial radio relay stations much more feasible,
since only one or at most few specific antenna pointing angles
need be cleared from potential interference.p7,p. 1 69J The
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geostationary orbit became the optimum available means of
providing communications satellite services.
In the final analysis, the use made of any communication
mode will depend on the superiority of some alternative mode
of providing a desired service. During the early to mid-sixties,
the communications satellite proved more economical than its
competition, undersea cable, microwave links, and HF,ll9,p,27j
There still remained the problem of frequency allocation. The
radio frequency range in which the satellite services could
best be developed (between 1,000 and 10K MHz) was already
allocated among, the heavily used by, various terrestrial radio
services. This conflict led to the specialized Space Extra-
ordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) in 1 963» With
the technical feasibility of sharing between satellite and
terrestrial systems in the foreground, and the economic advan-
tages of satellites in the background, a sharing scheme was
approved. Specifically, it was determined that microwave radio
relay services, with their narrow beam parallel to the earth's
surface and satellite services, with transmission paths outward
from the earth, could avoid harmful interference through coordi-
nation of the siting and design parameters of their systems.
This case was the first in which two different classes of service
were authorized simultaneous use of common operating frequencies
in a common area, a significant precedent. Actually the sharing
proposal was sponsored at the Conference by the U,S, and
European interests, who had so much to gain, with little regard
for positions of the lesser develoned countries. The decision
3k

was a major victory for the commercialized countries who,
having had their way for so long, still believed they knew what
was best for the world*
Politics and economics, factors that had heretofore re-
mained in the background of telecommunications spectrum alloca-
tion were beginning to emerge and share the spotlight with
technology. It was still necessary to show a proposal was
sound technically, but it would become increasingly obvious
that it must also be politically acceptable and economically
advantageous to the majority. It was technically feasible to
limit satellite signals to specific areas of the globe, thus
reducing the need for uniformity among regions. Economically
and politically however, it would remain advantageous to main-
tain uniformity. No longer was it sufficient to state that
something was possible, now intent and justification would be
debated before the world community. The view that the ITU was
becoming a political forum at the expense of technology was
typified by Professor Harold Jacobson of Michigan University
when he wrote :J23,p.b6J
The ITU's present structure with its elaborate
division of authority, is almost an invitation to
bickering about picayune matters and may well dis-
courage able personnel from association with the
Union. It also tends to compartmentize the con-
sideration of problems. This may have been appro-
priate when telephone, telegraph and radio were
really quite different, but modern technological
developments have made telecommunications systems
more and more similar and interdependent,
'//holistic treatment is clearly required.
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Realistically the developed nations continued to pursue
their interests on a narrow scale. The meetings to establish
INTELSAT were limited to the U.S. and European countries.J34}P«56j
The omission of the developing nations and the Soviet Union was
intentional and justified on the basis that the nations which
were present represented 90 percent of the international tele-
communications traffic and because a premium was placed on an
early completion of the negotiationsJ34jP«5Aj The developing
nations, while clearly technologically inferior, did not view
themselves as political inferiors and saw their exclusion as a
case of the "haves" holding back the "have nots." Their concerns
were summarized by the Russian international legal expert,
Mr. I. Chepov. His statement to the UN called for non-discrim-
inatory access to the international system and stated that,
"a truly global system could only be created through the ITU
and the UN."nZf,p.58j It was again being made clear that the
lesser developed countries must be considered in future propos-
als. With the one nation one vote procedures of the ITU, the
increasing number of emerging nations could be a powerful voice
in that forum.
The Montreux Conference held in 1965 continued the movement
of the union away from the lead of the so called colonial
powers. At that conference major changes were voted, amending
the structure of the union's hierarchy. The Administrative
Council was enlarged from 25 to 29 members, primarily to placate
the developing nations who continued to feel they did not have
a voice in policy matters. f~7, p. 17/ The enlargement opened seats
for four of the Third V/orld nations. The IFRB was reduced from
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11 members to 5 members in effect weakening its standing. The
United States had proposed that the IFRB be abolished completely
and its functions transferred to the Secretariat. The Third
World nations vehemently opposed this move, insisting that the
IFRB was performing a vital function in aiding the developing
countries select proper frequencies for particular uses. The
U.S. viewed it simply as a matter of an unneeded service (for
U.S.) and unnecessary expense. The above reduction was the
final compromise.
In a purely political move, the Third World, after long and
bitter debate forced the exclusion of white-ruled South Africa
and colonial Portugal from the conference. The U.S. had op-
posed this proposal on the grounds that it was in direct viola-
tion of the Convention which all governments represented had
ratified.^7, p. 1 3J The Third World also made demands for fiscal
and technical assistance. The mood of the United States'
delegate reflected the changes since 1959 in bis final report.
...it may be.. stated that if there was one dominant
note at the conference it was the oft-stated be-
lief that the ITU had as one of its basic functions
the requirement to assist the new and developing
nations with their individual telecommunications
problems. \7,p«14J
One of the stated ITU functions is to expand and improve
global telecommunications. It would seem the Third World's
point is valid.
The Montreux Conference was not, however, a clean sweep




1. The establishment of a special ITU technical assistance
fund over and above that provided by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP),
2. The establishment of Regional ITU offices in the LDC's
to aid these countries in developing domestic tele-
communications systems, and
3» The creation of a new and separate organization in the
ITU to deal exclusively with development assistance
matters which would be independent of the Secretary-
General and which would have its own elected director
as in the case of the CCITT (International Telegraph
and Telephone Consultative Committee) and the CCIR
(International Radio Consultative Committee).
It is the authors 1 opinion that this failure was a direct
result of the unified actions of the developed nations, the
fears of additional financial burdens and the continued political
disorganization of the Third World.
The final results of the conference were mixed at best.
Ever the optimist, the U.S. delegation's report read, "..There
is reason to believe that the next Plenipotentiary Conference,
of which it may be expected more experienced delegations from
the developing countries will attend, will move in the direc-
tion of accomplishment of the United States ob jectives.'y, p. M+\
It can be said that the U.S., during the decade of the
sixties was sympathetic to the plight of the lesser developed
countries. The U.S. supported many of the proposals that
widened the role of the Third World in telecommunications
matters. The sixties, though, were also a confused time. On
38

the one hand the U.S. was pouring massive foreign aid into the
lesser developed nations and providing technological and economic
assistance through programs sponsored by the U.N. and through
the Peace Corps. It was also fighting an unpopular war in
Vietnam. The arms race, Vietnam, and even the race to the moon
affected our standing with the rest of the world. It is the
authors' view that when the seventies began our technological
standing was unsurpassed, our economic climate was good and our
political standing was somewhat diminished in the view of the
smaller nations of the world.
The Twenty-ninth General Assembly of the U.N. was indicative
of the attitudes of the lesser developed nations. Often the U.S.
could at most align blocs of two or three votes. The Soviet
Union's diplomatic fortunes were on the upswing.j64>P«45J Though
by 1971 it was apparent that the majority of the Third World
states would not go Communist, it was nevertheless possible for
the Soviets to discourage any good relations the Third World
might have considered establishing with the West. The U.S.
and Europe were seen as colonial powers while the Soviets were
viewed as supporters of Third World Nationalism.
C. 1971 TO PRESENT
In 1971 an Extraordinary Administrative Conference on Space
Communications was convened in Geneva. Its scope was limited to
the problem of satellite frequency allocations. The conference
allotted spectrum in the higher bands for use in satellite
broadcasting and other satellite service. The overall increase
was by a factor of 55.154, p»E-8/ The accepted proposals provided
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technically sound allocations and the conference was notably-
free of political maneuvering.^, p.E-8j Satellite communications
was becoming the norm for many developed countries. This could
free portions of the spectrum for use by other non-satellite
users. Most notably it was believed these openings would come
in the HF bands, heavily utilized by smaller nations. It is
the view of the authors 1 that the nations of the world would
support their own economic interests, and when proposals coin-
cided with the interests of a large number of participants the
outcome of negotiations would usually be successful. After this
brief lull, the political factors moved once again to the fore-
front in 1973. At the Plenipotentiary Conference held that year
in Spain, South Africa and Portugal were prohibited from partic-
ipating in all future WARC ! s, this was due to their unpopular
governments. At the same time the conference cancelled the
membership of the U.S., Britain, French, Spanish and Portuguese
territories thus additionally weakening the developed countries
position. While the exclusion of U.S. Territories took votes
from the U.S. it also reduced its financial contribution from
11 percent to 6.5 percent of the budget, yj
,
p. 1 5j This loss of
financial base prompted a resolution to change the system from
voluntary to a United Nations contributory scale. Passage of
the proposal would have raised the contribution share of the
U.S. to 25 percent of the ITU budget. The measure was defeated
only after a concerted effort on the part of the U.S. and the
USSR. [?, p. 15J
An additional resolution raised the number of members on
the Administrative Council to 36. The majority of these seats
kO

were given to the developing nations, thereby increasing their
power. Another proposal established a voluntary technical coop-
eration fund over U.S. objections. {!>/+, p. /+6j Proposals for es-
tablishment of regional ITU offices and the creation of a new
Consultative Committee to deal with development matters were,
however, again defeated.
In Spain the LDC bloc was led by Saudi Arabia, but it was
Algeria who rallied the Third World at. the 1974 Conference in
Geneva under the battle cry of "equal rights for all." \ 64,P»48J
The 1974 Conference was a specialized one dealing with maritime
matters. The Third World countries marshalled their forces to
impose on the Conference an Allotment Table and procedures based
upon nationalism rather than sound engineering principles. A
caucus of Middle Eastern, African, and South American countries
with little or no technical support won approval of the new al-
location table. Previously, the allotments were made to coun-
tries with a stated need with channel selections based on
engineering, geographical, and operational criteria. Priority
restraints were imposed with consideration for greater traffic
loads and the seniority of the channel requirement. Thus, a
limited number of allotments appeared on each channel with a
recognized order of priority to be followed in case of harmful
interference. Because not every country needed a coastal radio
system, meaningless allotments to countries with no requirement
were avoided. The new rules however provide maritime frequen-
cies to all nations on an equal basis even if they have no coast
line at allj6, pJ5j The procedural changes reversed the provision
protecting first assignees to a frequency from interference
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from a late arrival. It now provides for negotiation between
the newcomer and first assignee. However, it also allows the
newcomer in, under certain circumstances with full protection
from interference equal to that of the first assignee, almost a
technical impossibility. Vk9, p. 3J The U.S. took a reservation to
these proposals in protest of the politicization, as did several
other nations. In the years since the creation of the ITU, the
U.S. had never before taken a reservation on an allocation
issue. A reservation means that the U.S. reserves the right to
assign frequencies in another manner if the ITU plan is not
nationally acceptable.
While the Third World 1 s performance at the 197A- Conference
may appear as a sort of immature nationalism, it has its roots
in economics. The radio spectrum represents a capital asset to
the LDC's. A valuable commodity to have, even if it presently
remains unused. This asset could be turned into future cash
flows by leasing the spectrum to other nations or by coaxing
new business interests to settle within its boundaries due to
the available frequencies for communications and data trans-
mission. While much of the Third World's actions are purely
political maneuvering for power at home and abroad, such economic
issues are also important.
At the conclusion of the 197^ WARC, it was all too clear
that the LDC's had the power necessary to pass or defeat any
proposal at future WARC's.
A separate but related development occurred at the Sixth
Special Session of the United Nations in 197*f» The developing
nations demanded a massive reallocation of the world's resources
kZ

to create a "new world economic order," Telecommunications were
not specifically mentioned, but strong reference was made to
setting the priorities for all types of assistance. The ITU's
Secretary General hailed the Sixth Special Session as ".. a de-
cisive turning point in the history of mankind and that of the
ITU." He further stated that the ITU, "..welcomes enthusias-
tically the opportunity offered to cooperate, within the sphere
of its competence, in implementing the establishment of a new
international economic order."j28,p .21 These actions by the U.N.
and the views of the ITU Secretary General added legitimacy to
the demands of the Third World.
Another vital issue to the LDC's and sometimes the Soviet
Union is a nation 1 s alleged right to control information broad-
casted across its borders from without. The newly emerging
nations, for the most part, saw this control as a way of
shielding their populace from outside propaganda during the
usually sensitive period of early independence and development.
The Soviet's support of these controls in the authors' view,
is a direct reflection of its form of government, which requires
control of the information flow to the masses. The 1977 WASC on
Broadcasting Satellites became the forum for this issue when it
was not addressed at the UNESCO conference of that year. The
Conference accepted, in the 12 GHz band, technical interference
standards that would effectively eliminate future transnational
direct satellite broadcasting without the prior consent of the
target country. This was strong political action as direct
satellite broadcasting was still in the experimental stage.
Satellites and receivers had not yet been developed which would
k3

permit direct broadcasting by one country to conventional radio
or television receivers in another country; or even in the same
country. The U.S. delegation stated that it did not "explicitly"
endorse this principal, and that its traditional position fav-
oring free international flow of information had not changed,
but without strong U.S. opposition the effect was the same.^66, p3J
In addition to the adoption of the broadcast standards, the
Conference ignored the U.S. argument that action assigning
specific frequency orbital positions for satellites (geosta-
tionary type) should be postponed until the technology had been
perfected. Consequently, Regions 1 and 3 countries were assigned
portions of the spectrum which some of them may never be able
to use. [66, p. 5J Only the countries of Region 2 (the Western
Hemisphere) were persuaded by the U.S. to delay this drastic
action. However, the Region 2 countries, including the U.S.,
have committed themselves to confer again on this issue no
later than 1982, most probably at the 1979 WARC. This principle
of equal access established in 1 97^4- and reinforced in 1977 is
a demonstration of the Third World's ability to wield political
power in international bodies. FCC Commissioner and leader of
the U.S. delegation, Robert E. Lee's, remarks during the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on Communications
Hearings in May of 1977 typified the government's approach.
He stated that the U.S. has always taken the position that the
ITU is a technical rather than a political body, and that when
political considerations arise, they should be submitted to the
United Nations. [06, p. i] This approach fails to recognize the
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realities of a numerically superior group of countries that
will seek their perceived national interests in any forum
available.
The historical trend is clear. The new technology of
wireless communications was "born almost a century ago. As it
rapidly developed more and more uses became available through
technological leaps. Each use provided economic benefits to the
user. These economic benefits nurtured new technological
advances. As the finite spectrum became increasingly saturated
political action was necessary to provide equitable and effi-
cient use of the resource. In reality ten percent of the world*
s
population has controlled ninety percent of the world's
telecommunications and it's associated economic benefits. The
ninety percent of the world's population that has been without
these benefits is flexing its political muscles in hopes of
increasing its share. The U.S. must recognize and in fact be
sympathetic to this trend if it is to remain the world's leader
in telecommunications.
D. SUMMARY
In the earliest stages of frequency allocation the model
operated around the periphery (marketing process) and the
regulatory section was basically transparent. The authors'
view is that the ageless American ideas of technology and a
free market guided the process. As demand increased, technology
dictated where new users would be located in the spectrum. The
benefits were significantly greater than the associated costs
and fueled further increases in demand. As noted in the history,
W?

the period from 1957 to 1971 represented a transition phase.
During that time the costs of spectrum expansion increased as
users moved into higher bands. The benefits were still rela-
tively great but the associated costs to other users began to
rise rapidly. With the technological path becoming partially
blocked by increased expansion costs the regulatory process
took on more significance. It was during this period that
international politics and economics began to have an ever
increasing affect upon allocation decisions. The more the
political path was used the larger the bureaucracy grew with
its associated factors of negotiation politics, international
conflicts and bureaucratic sluggishness. The allocation deci-
sions of this period began the trend toward modification of
existing spectrum as opposed to expansion.
Since 1971 the technological path has tended to be blocked
to all but the most affluent nations. The U.S. has continued
to pursue this path, virtually ignoring until recently the
growing trend -toward the political path. Because of this the
U.S. has utilized purely technological strategies and only
shown cursory interest in the other factors that affect the
regulatory process. It is important to note that according to
the model's operation as the technological path becomes blocked
the internal factors of the regulatory process take on added
importance. Today they are vital to any continued movement
toward U.S. goals. It has been this U.S. attitude of refusing
to recognize the importance of the regulatory process that has
put us at a disadvantage in relation to the rest of the world.







Frequency usage within the U.S., or the provision and
use of the services made possible by the radio spectrum fall
into two categories; Federal Government usage and non-Federal
Government use. Figure 2 shows the division of these frequencies.
Federal government usage of the spectrum includes every Federal
Agency. Figure 3 lists the percentage use of each Federal
Agency. The Departments of Defense and Transportation utilize
65 percent of all government frequencies. The bulk of these,
and therefore of all government use, can be classified as na-
tional security interests and safety of life interests.
There is also significant interplay between government
and non-government uses. Non-Government ships and aircraft are
served by Government radio facilities; Federal law enforcement
agencies have communication links with state and local agencies;
Federal power systems interconnect with non-Federal, and so
forth. Additionally the Federal Government relies heavily on
commercial systems through leased lines, AT&T, and leased
satellite channels to fulfill its mission.
The government's interest in the present communications
spectrum is formidable. The Department of Defense's expendi-
tures for communications-electronic equipment are approximately
310 billion dollars a year, consuming 50 percent of the elec-
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System (NCS) serves 1930 locations in the U.S. and 1233 in for-
eign countries. Government owned radio facilities include high
frequency stations providing voice channels and teletype,
microwave systems and satellite links. All together, over
2,200,000 miles of voice channel and over 3,200,000 miles of
teletype channel are supported by these facilities. The total
number of government frequency assignments has grown from
110,578 in 1966 to 12^,762 in 1975 to ,140,000 in 1978. Because
of the long distances generally involved, often over long
stretches of ocean, the two types of radio facilities that are
normally considered typical for international communications
are HF and satellites. Because of its high volume of inter-
national communications, and the associated costs of HF spectrum
saturation, the U.S. has come to rely on satellites and undersea
cables for the vast majority of its international communications.
As a result, use of HF radio for such services has declined
substantially over the last decade, primarily because of the
very limited capacity possible through HF radio circuits. The
current U.S. proposals contained in FCC Docket 20271 j^57, p. 1 69I
propose reductions of approximately 30 percent in the frequencies
assigned to HF point to point service. These frequencies would
be reallocated to broadcast services.
The trends in government usage are to higher frequencies
that provide higher capacity and therefore an increased data to
band width ratio. As developed by the International Communica-
tions Agency (ICA) and the Board of International Broadcasting
(BIB), HF broadcasting requirements have also continually in-
creased. The primary services, Voice of America (VOA), 3adio
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Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) have grown from 400
frequency hours daily in 1950 to 2100 frequency hours daily last
year. The number of transmitters has grown from 54 to 155» The
rapid growth of HF broadcasting has placed much pressure upon the
Federal Government to relinquish HF FIXED frequencies. While as
stated previously the HF FIXED frequency usage has declined, it
still provides the major method of redundancy for the more
sophisticated microwave and satellite systems. Additionally
microwave and satellite systems are susceptible to jamming and
high maintenance costs.
The VHF, UHF and to some extent the SHF bands are rapidly
becoming saturated. The military controls a huge portion of
this band, with most tactical circuits within this range. The
basic line of sight properties of this portion of the spectrum
make it ideal for a number of different systems. The Federal
Government's usage includes the Fleet Satellite Communications
System of the Navy, 20,000 miles of microwave systems both local
and national, doppler shift navigation satellite systems, in-
strument landing systems, telemetry and tracking and
meteorological aids. r54,P»E-4j
On the non-Government side frequency usage has expanded
as much if not more than the Federal Government. More than
800,000 applications for frequencies are received each year by
the FCC. The largest non-Government user of frequency spectrum
is the Broadcasting service. It reaches practically into every
home and automobile and is allocated 372 MHz of prime spectrum
space, /fO percent of the frequency band 30-960 MHz. Sixty
percent of the space in that band is allocated exclusively to
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non-Government use. It has the largest public capital invest-
ment of any radio service, an estimated $32 billion dollars in
368.6 million AM and FM receivers and 109,8 million TV receivers.
Television revenues alone are $5 billion dollars a year. The
number of broadcasting transmitters grew from 25,557 in 1970 to
29,131 in 1973 alone. [54, p.D-36]
Land mobile services and citizen band radio have also
expanded rapidly. Commercial microwave systems transmitters
have increased by 500 a year since 1970, while COMSAT and other
earth terminals have added to the rapid increases in spectrum
usage. (j+3jP.237j
Microwave growth has also been significant. The com-
munications common carriers of the U.S. have in excess of 60
million miles of individual telephone channels and about 100
thousand miles of television video transmission channels. In
addition there are the private uses of microwave (railroad,
pipeline, utilities) covering another 50 thousand miles y+3jP»237J
The demand for microwave frequencies continues to be high,
especially in urban areas where its short line of sight prop-
erties and low interference ratio can be utilized.
Television Broadcasting historically was concentrated
in the allocated VHF frequencies with only sparse development of
the UHF spectrum. The large profit producing characteristics of
television have now placed all TV allocated spectrum at a premium.
The advent of cable television systems has allowed UHF stations
to reach out to ranges equal with the VHF stations and in the




From the U.S. standpoint saturation exists in all bands
below 30 GHz. J54jP«D-6j Only good management and advancing
technology enable the efficient use of the many diverse services.
The developed countries of the world have followed the
lead of the U.S. to higher frequency, higher capacity systems
utilizing our available technology. Some differences in emphasis
exist, however, due to geographical considerations. The European
countries have a regional satellite system and also some domes-
tic satellite coverage. The close proximity of borders has
resulted in an increased reliance upon microwave systems for
internal communications. The proximity problem also necessitated
large capital outlays by some countries, most notably Britain in
under sea cables, which slowed their move to satellites. Never-
theless, satellite system increases are still formidable, with
7,000 circuits in the Atlantic Ocean region by the end of
I977.[57,p.7ij
Even with the competition from other systems the growth
of satellite service has been significant. Intelsat, the
International Satellite consortium has opened high speed and
high capacity communication to many countries which previously
were unable to afford the technology. Between 1967 and 1 969
Intelsat II Satellites were launched in both the Atlantic and
Pacific ocean regions. These second generation satellites
provided 2.1+0 voice circuits, permitting 2.1+0 subscribers on one
continent to speak simultaneously to 21+0 subscribers on another
continent, thereby introducing an important distinction from
transoceanic cable facilities - the ability to have multiple
destinations transmit and receive simultaneously; a cable
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connects only two points. The Intelsat III series extended
satellite communications to the Indian ocean region and increased
the capacity to 1500 telephone circuits. This large increase
permitted use of the system for transoceanic television service
on a non interruptable basis. The Intelsat IV series, placed
in orbit between 1 97 1 and 1975 provided a capacity for 4000
telephone circuits and two additional television channels. The
Intelsat IV A series launches are presently in progress, in-
creasing the capacity to 6500 circuits. ["57, p. 65J Thus satellite
communications are available to all nations.
HF FIXED circuits have declined worldwide just as in
the U.S. with a corresponding increase in the demand for HF
Broadcast circuits, primarily in the tropics and for maritime
use. While the declining trend of HF FIXED service is a fact,
bilateral discussions with a number of countries reveal a
continuing need for significant numbers of HF FIXED systems for
domestic and regional networks.
The importance of communications internationally can be
shown by the Department of Commerce's latest statistics contained
in reference 37.
1. Germany - Total consumption of electronic components
for 1977 was $1,7 billion.
2. Japan - Market research for 1977 indicated a tele-
communication market of 3640 million dollars.
3. Mexico - A total market of $448 million for tele-
communication equipment.
4» France - Modernization of the countries telephone
system to incorporate microwave/satellite technology.
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It is clear that with the availability of technology
and international assistance the communications systems of the
world are becoming more and more sophisticated, with respect to
higher data transmission rates. The overall result is a shortage
of available frequency spectrum in the already crowded HF Broad-
cast, television, microwave and satellite bands. The demand for
this finite resource continues to increase.
2. Future
The United States will continue in the authors' view,
to expand its EF broadcast requirements and reduce its HF FIXED
assets, but the need for redundant military HF systems will
remain at least until 1990.
3y 1985 over 7500 earth terminals will be needed in the
U.S. to provide 300,000 voice ports. The Commerce department
estimates electronic goods sales will reach $ZfO,2 billion by
1983 while TV revenues will approach $5.3 million. H+7, ?•£] FCC
authorized transmitters in the Safety and Special Radio services,
assuming sufficient frequencies are available, will reach 18. A-
million. Simultaneously, the Federal government equipment
inventory will be valued at 360 billion, p+7, p. 5j
While technology has created and encouraged the desire
for additional uses of the spectrum it has also provided methods
to cope with the associated problems of the increased demand.
High capacity cables, fiber optics, lower bandwidth separation,
directional systems and bit packing techniques are just a few of
the new methods that will act to alleviate the saturated condi-
tions of the frequency spectrum. The overall effect is to




Through INTELSAT and the multinational corporations,
high capacity sophisticated communications systems are becoming
available worldwide. Countries that previously relied upon
antiquated (by US standards) systems, due to a lack of tech-
nological skill or a shortage of the enormous capital investment
required for modern systems are now planning to lease or rent
sophisticated systems. In the authors' opinion, the next twenty
years will see all countries of the world obtaining satellite
access and modern domestic communications systems. The next
generation of Intelsat satellite (Intelsat V) will have a ca-
pacity of approximately 12,500 telephone circuits, double the
capacity of Intelsat IVA. [_57,p.65j Planned regional and domestic
satellite communications markets around the world will create a
32 billion non-US earth station market by 1990, according to
Frost and Sullivan forecasters. M
1 , p. ^3j Most important among
these are five regional systems in a planning stage and three
foreign domestic systems already in operation.
The first regional system to be operational will be
ARABSAT this year, a two satellite system with a 2000 voice
circuit, k TV circuit capacity each. A European system, the
European Communications Satellite (ECS) is also in the planning
stage. It will provide an operational network to member nations
with 5000 voice channels in 1980 and 20,000 by 1990. Other
regional markets include SERLA, the Regional System of Tele-
communications in Latin America and the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) system. {_1 1 , p. A-3j
The final identified regional system is Africa. The
present telecommunications network in Africa is in its early
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stages of growth. Numerous satellite broadcasting systems for
countries south of the Sahara have been proposed in recent years,
While no specified plan has been adopted, experts predict that
Africa may represent the largest earth station market of the
1990»s.[l1,p.Zfi]
With FIXED Satellite service firmly entrenched in the
spectrum, its mate, direct Satellite Broadcasting is nearing
reality. A long sought after system that is only now becoming
technically feasible and affordable, direct satellite broad-
casting could bring satellite communications into each home on
a worldwide basis. Direct systems are already planned for
Germany, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. Most of these will
be completed during the 80' s. {~29,p.91J
Direct Satellite Broadcasting brings with it other
problems than more saturation of the spectrum. These are dis-
cussed in a later section.
Another medium that must be included in future trends is
the further development of undersea cables. Another trans-
atlantic cable is planned for 1981 with an additional ifOOO
circuit capacity e '.Vhile cables are viewed by some as an archaic
means of communication, they provide diversity and therefore
add to the overall efficiency of a communication network. The
European community, especially, views cable systems as a viable
alternative to the risk of high cost satellite outages. j~57,p.72J
With 94 nations participating and some 80 percent of the
world's overseas traffic going by satellite, the trend is clear.
Domestic traffic and services to mobile platforms will probably
represent the greatest portion of satellite traffic ten years
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hence. The satellites will continue to exploit the solid state
revolution so as to permit increasingly complicated communica-
tions, r29jP»89J One can expect on board message switching and
processing in great quantities. In the authors 1 view, the
military organizations of the U.S. and other countries and groups
will expand their satellite activities so as to exploit the
spectacular tactical possibilities. Digital technology will
predominate in future development. Broadcast satellites, long
possible technically but politically sensitive, will slowly come
into their own due to antenna techniques used to restrict useful
signal levels to within a national boundary. The ability of
NASA's space shuttle to launch large payloads will make the
exploitation of all the techniques easier.
B. POLITICAL TRENDS
Rapidly expanding telecommunications technology has provided
untold benefits to the world community. Educational services,
health information distribution, and scientific information
sharing are just a few of the many missions telecommunications
has fulfilled. It is inevitable however, that telecommunica-
tion technology should also have its political realities.
In simplistic terms the world community can be classified
into three groups; The Western-bloc lead by the U.S„ the Soviet-
Warsaw bloc and the so called non-aligned bloc. r6i+,p»4 /+j They
can also be classified as the rich and poor with the first two
in the former category and the non-aligned bloc in the latter.
This large group of nations called non-aligned (also referred to
as Lesser Developed Countries or LDC) have only recently become
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a force on the political scene. They were almost entirely born
out of the old colonial empires, most notably the British
Empire. [64jP«^f3j As such these countries have many political
commonalities; most adhere to socialistic principles and are
inherently suspicious of the developed countries of the world
both East and West.
In a sense these LDCs are a paradox. They are lacking in
technological skills and economic resources but control many of
the natural resources utilized by the more powerful developed
nations. During the early stages of their recent history,
fierce nationalism and political instability prevented them from
making their voices heard in the world's international organiza-
tions. To a large degree the developed countries continued to
treat the LDCs as if they were still colonies. Due to their
poor economies the LDCs were forced to trade these natural
resources for the basic necessities of life at terms dictated
by the developed nations.
Realization of the LDCs political power began modestly
enough as UN delegates of non-aligned countries pooled their
votes, thus enabling them to force acceptance of their resolu-
tions in the General Assembly. It wasn't long before regional
conferences established organizations to forward the interests
of the LDCs. The result is that much political power is in
the hands of LDCs as a whole. As an example, Algeria could not
force spectrum concessions from the developed nations, the LDC
bloc can. The political power of the LDCs is particularly
effective in organizations that adhere to the one-country, one-




In order to describe the political trends it is necessary
to examine the state of telecommunications as viewed from the
eyes of the developed countries and the LDC's.
The developed countries presently control all the economic
power of telecommunications. Through Government actions, they
control the communications-electronics industry of the world
and therefore the technology. Moreover they control INTELSAT;
the US. alone has a 53 percent voting block, r3 z+,P«58J Additionally,
even though they represent only ten percent of the worlds pop-
ulation, the developed countries are allocated ninety percent
of the spectrum. Thus telecommunications provide a significant
economic resourse for the developed nations. It is also vital
to the developed nations maintenance of worldwide interests and
influence. One has only to surmise the effect a loss of com-
munications circuits would have on the US, command and control
system to appreciate the importance of the possessed spectrum.
Since the developed countries can only maintain their
standards of living and influence by continued growth, these
nations view the LDC market as a means to this end. It is the
opinion of the authors that it is economically and politically
advantageous to assist the LDC's in the development of modern
telecommunications; economically, because of the revenues this
assistance will generate and politically, because of the
increased influence to be gained.
It would be a comforting thought that the developed nations
of the world are helping their poorer brothers to reduce poverty
and improve the lot of the world community, Realistically if
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humanitarian principles were stripped away, assisting the LDCs
in a bootstrap effort could increase world stability while it
continues to expand the markets of the developed countries.
The perception of the situation from the LDCs viewpoint,
is markedly different. The predominantly socialistic governments
of the LDCs have a well documented adversion for anything
giving the appearance of colonialism. [6k, P« 45J They follow the
socialistic principles of redistribution of wealth which views
profit as synonomous with exploitation.
The LDCs therefore see modern telecommunications technology
as their just right and the radio frequency spectrum as a world
resource to which they are entitled free access. This conclusion
is drawn from recent history. The LDCs arguments for a more
equal footing in telecommunications directly parellels those
they make in demanding acceptance of a so called New 7/orld
Economic Order. They have used the United Nations as the prin-
cipal forum for advocating their case for greater access to
technology, capital, and resources that they see as unfairly
monopolized by the more developed nations, particularly the
former Western colonial powers. \&k, p« kkj
During the Cold War period, the USSH regularly attacked
the West in general and the United States in particular. The
split along East-West lines consumed more than its fair share of
conference time at both the United Nations and the ITU. \ 6 I
The difference today is that in the past the U.S. knew from
where these attacks would be coming and also had the votes to
carry its positions. Now the Third World is the opposition and
they have the votes (without technical expertise) to prevail.
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Modern, sophisticated telecommunications systems in the
hands of a newly independent or lesser developed nation are a
source of national pride and also strong weapons in the struggle
for political and economic survival. The pride comes from the
possession of an advanced technology system. These systems can
be a means of informing or controlling the population through
broadcasting, A nation with worldwide communications access can
make its voice heard and make itself more appealing to foreign
investors. Access to these systems and spectrum space is a
source of revenue for the LDC's, a fact they have realized and
are exploiting. The LDC's feel they have the political power
to gain this access now on their own terms. These terms include
control of broadcast content by nation, frequencies utilized,
and increased technical and financial aid for telecommunications
systems.
The LDC's have been unhappy about the dominance of V/estern
news organizations in coverage and dissemination of world news,
r35jP«1j They feel that too little attention is given to LDC f s
and that what news is carried tends to be unfavorable and unfair
to them. At the biennial meeting of UNESCO at Nairobe in 1976,
at the specialized 'YARC in 1977, and at the non-aligned Broad-
cast Conference at Sarajevo, Yugoslavia in 1977 resolutions
were presented that would give governments greater control over
news generated and consumed within their own boundaries. In
all cases action was delayed, but a unified stance is only a
matter of time. The post colonial feeling of exploitation runs
deep, [35,p,3j Though not mentioned specifically in the conference
documents, (BROADCAST CONFERENCE) there were repeated references
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by delegates during post-conference public statements to the
need for their respective countries to cut back on the impor-
tation of "western films" for television broadcasting and to
expectations of significantly greater assistance to the broad-
casting organizations of the non-aligned by UNESCO (funded by
the DEVELOPED NATIONS)
. £35, p. H Reasons given for the former
included allegations that such films are too heavily western
culture laden, and that their ready availability tends to inhibit
more costly domestic film production. Also noted was the fact
that, in constantly exposing the people of their countries to a
western standard of living, with which their governments may
never be able to provide, they may be inherently destablizing
politically. [35, P»2J The INTELSAT television usage figures
substantiate the dominance of western broadcasting. Countries
having greater than 50 hours per person per year of television
usage were in diminishing order, the following: Spain, USA,
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Japan, Italy, Argentina, Germany,
Colombia, U,K, Australia and France. The developing countries in
this list, however, had substantially more "receive" than transmit
time, while the top five television transmit countries were
Spain, USA, Australia, UK and Italy. [3k,V» 1 30
J
The evidence of how much influence western broadcasting
has on a developed nation's culture is less compelling. To
illustrate this point, figure k lists the Intelsat member
countries with the number of telephones per capita. This list
shows an extreme of from 64«98 per 100 to 0.06 per 100. Further,
29 out of the 7k countries for which data are available have less




TELEPHONES PER TELEPHONES PER
SIGNATORY 100 POPULATION SIGNATORY 100 POPULATION
Algeria 1.28 Liechtenstein 49.52
Argentina 7.17 Luxembourg 32.68
Australia 31.18 Malagasy Republic 0.39
Austria 19.29 Malaysia (Approx.) 1.50
Barbados 11.16 Mauritania Not Available
Belgium 20.83 Mexico 2.97
Brazil 2.17 Monaco 64.98
Cameroon Not Available Morocco 1.08
Canada 45.23 Netherlands 26.00
Ceylon 0.50 New Zealand 44.14
Chile 3.78 Nicaragua 1.29
Republic of China 2.75 Nigeria 0.12
Colombia 4.54 Norway 29.41
Costa Rica 3.48 Pakistan 0.18
Denmark 34.42 Panama Not Available
Dominican Republic 1.15 Peru 1.61
Ecuador Not Available Philippines 0.81
Egypt Not Available Portugal 7.76
Ethiopia 0.18 Saudi Arabia Not Available
France 17.19 Senegal Not Available
Gabon 1.36 Singapore 7.78
Germany 22.43 South Africa 7.06
Ghana 0.68 Spain 13.56
Greece 11.96 Sudan 0.29
Guatemala 0.77 Sweden 55.67
India - 0.23 Switzerland 48.26
Indonesia 0.17 Syria 1.84
Iran 1.06 Tanzania 0.27
Iraq 1.24 Thailand 0.42
Ireland 10.44 Trinidad & Tobago
Israel 17.47 Tunisia 1.50
Italy 17.38 Turkey 1.62
Ivory Coast Not Available Uganda 0.31
Jamaica 3.66 U.K. 26.68
Japan 25.14 U.S. 58.35
Jordan 1.30 Vatican City Not Available
Kenya 0.70 Venezuela 3.90
Korea 2.01 Viet Nam 0.19
Kuwait 9.08 Yemen 0.06
Lebanon 6.78 Yugoslavia 3.57








































(Ref. 3^, P. 132)

minor impact which INTELSAT satellites have created in terms of
affecting the mass culture of INTELSAT member- countries with
relatively underdeveloped economics, particularly when it is
realized that the availability of television sets is far more
restricted. Thus, for countries with developing economies,
INTELSAT in most cases has only affected the economic eliteJJ3^pJ33J
While at times the LDC's present a unified stance there
still exists no clear consensus on all issues. It is therefore
predictable that at least for the near future sound technical
reasoning and self-interest will influence the political stance
of individual LDC's.
C. FREQUENCY ALLOCATION 3Y THE ITU
As previously noted not all frequencies are suitable for
telecommunications services. Over the years the spectrum has
been divided into bands. These bands are then allocated to the
type of service for which they are best suited. The ITU allocates
a given frequency to a particular station or serviceopifl The
respective government then regulates the location, time of use,
and strength of each station. A problem can arise with adjoining
countries; because of the overcrowding of the spectrum, neigh-
boring nations are sometimes, unavoidably assigned the same
frequency, thus making interference almost unavoidable. To
counteract the interference, the response has been to install
and use more powerful and more expensive transmitters and
receivers. As one can readily observe a vicious cycle is started.
International Broadcasting has grown rapidly since World
War II and is a point of serious contention in the radio spectrum
deliberations. The United States used international broadcasting
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in its Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
broadcasts. The legitimate sanctioned broadcasts would be very
adequate to reach their intended audiences were it not for the
interference problem. The Third World wants to expand its
international broadcasting for political recognition and prestige
and to reach expatriates in the developed countries. Not having
ITU allocated frequencies for international broadcasting, the
LDC's now use aerial mobile and radio navigation bands on a
"not to interfere'1 basis.
In the developed countries technology has eased the HF
communication burden somewhat. The United States and other
developed countries are increasingly relying on communications
satellites, undersea cables, and terrestrial microwave systems
for point to point non-broadcast communications traffic. H+3J
Using these systems for telephone, telex, facsimile, and data
transmission, frees 50 to 50 percent of the fixed broadcast
spectrum from its traditional use.U,p.2j
The crux of the spectrum allocation problem is how to
equitably allocate the freed spectrum to other services. The
LDC's even though using some of these frequencies illegally,
will not be willing to relinquish them. The LDC's rely on them
for domestic and international communications. This use of
non-broadcast frequencies for broadcast purposes only perpetuates
and magnifies the interference factors.
Those trying to receive the United States broadcast signals
find it difficult to do so. In order to have a high probability
of reaching their audience, United States broadcasters must use
three different freauencies. If the interference could be
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reduced this would allow a reduction in duplication of signals
freeing more frequencies for reallocation. This is a perfect
example of how the benefits of cooperation could produce a
mutual gain situation for all concerned parties.
D. 7/ARC 79 PREPARATIONS
1. U.S.
The foregoing is the backdrop for the international forum
(V/ARC 79) to be held late this year. In keeping with the his-
torical facts, and the technical and political trends, the U.S.
government has set forth the following internal negotiating




To maintain flexibility to meet the future needs of
users in telecommunications matters (Domestic and International)
within the framework of the International Radio Regulations.
b. Minimal Change
Changes to the Radio Regulations should only be
those that are absolutely required in order to meet the needs
of users.
c. Defendable Positions
Proponents of new requirements should be in a position
to defend the required revisions of the Radio Regulations, using
sound and fully developed technical arguments.
d. Accommodate World Needs
Negotiations should take into account changes ad-
vanced by other nations and these changes should be resisted
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only when they impede our national flexibility to an unacceptable
degree.
e. Point of No Return
Where it is apparent that changes to the Radio
Regulations, including modified allocations, are likely to be
opposed, negotiators must have final fall-back positions.
It is logical that all proposals have first and foremost a
technically sound foundation. It should also be clear that
just as the foundation of a house is only a secure footing for
the structure, so too must a sound political and economic policy
be built upon solid technical foundations for the conference.
Only in this way will the final structure be well built, lasting
and comfortable for the world community that must abide with it.
The preparations within the U.S. have spurred much debate.
Each federal agency, industry and private interest group involved
have for the most part sought advantages for themselves while
protecting their past gains. Since in the aggregate this is
impossible the final U.S. positions are compromises.
These preparations are a Microcosm of how the T.7ARC neg-
otiations will proceed. Each administration desires those
changes advantageous to itself and rejects those it sees as
detrimental to its interests. The final product, like the house
noted above, must evolve from some compromises that detract as
little as possible from the stability of the structure.
Preparation of the U.S. proposals to be sent to the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the joint responsi-
bility of the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) and the Federal Communications Commission.
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The Government's requirements are being developed in the Ad
Hoc 144 group of the IRAC (Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee) • UfO, p. 2j The FCC is determining the public's desires
by issuing Notices of Inquiries (NOT's). At present, there are
many working groups within which the government's needs are
being coordinated with the public's desires. The following
paragraphs explain who is contributing what at each point.
In the sub-groups of Ad Hoc 144 Committee, each Federal
agency provides their senior technical personnel in spectrum
management who both present their agency's requirements and
participate in the negotiating process resulting in first draft
proposals designed to satisfy those requirements. W+O, p. 2J All
proposals developed in the sub-groups of Ad Hoc 144 are reviewed
again by the full Ad Hoc Committee and once again by the full
IRAC. At this level Federal agency participation is through the
senior individuals in the spectrum support and policy areas.
These individuals are qualified to ascertain whether generated
proposals will meet foreseen, often congressionally mandated,
programs and provide the necessary flexibility to allow the
exercise of agency program options. If any agency's long range
programs and/or policy options are adversely affected by the
developed proposals, these senior staff personnel so advise the
directors of their agencies.
In like manner, the Radio Service V/orking groups each provided
delineation of their requirements to the FCC. The four FCC
functional committees meld those statements of requirements into
a set of draft Commission proposals for review by the FCC
steering committee. Representatives of the International
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Conference Staff in the International and Operations Office of
the Commission meet with Ad Hoc 144 (and with all of its sub-
groups) so that both ' the Government and non-Government require-
ments are being continuously considered and the set of
proposals being produced is, in fact, a draft U.S. National
position.
After review and approval by the IRAC and FCC steering
committee, the proposals are issued to the public in the form
of Notices of Inquiry in Doc. 20271. Thus, while the NTIA and
the IRAC are reviewing the proposals for National policy and
agency policy implications, the general public, the industry,
and state and local governments, are reviewing those same pro-
posals in FCC Notices of Inquiry. Comments and reply comments
submitted to those Notices of Inquiry and further inputs from
the Federal agencies through this same Ad Hoc 144 process then
result in the next iteration of the developing proposals.
Policy review is effected from an agency standpoint in the IRAC.
Policy review from the National Telecommunications Policy
standpoint is effected by the Director of Spectrum Plans and
Policies in NTIA and by the FCC Commissioners at the time they
consider and approve the release of the Notices of Inquiry.
When the finally developed recommended U.S. position is
jointly and simultaneously presented by the FCC and NTIA to the
Department of State for adoption, it will receive a final review
from the standpoint of foreign policy. This review should,
however, be a very simple matter since the State Department's
Representative to the IRAC comes from the Office of International
Communications policy, in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, and
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foreign policy considerations have been continually examined
throughout the entire preparatory process.
The two principal players in these preparations are the FCC
and the IRAC. The Federal Communications Commission is an in-
dependent Government agency responsible directly to Congress.
It was established by the Communications Act of 1934, and is
charged with regulating interstate and international communica-
tions by radio, television, wire and cable. The regulatory
powers of the Commission were expanded by the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 which gave the FCC authority to regulate
U.S. portions of satellite systems. [54,p.C- 13J
The FCC is directed by seven Commissioners, appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate for 7 year terms. One
commissioner is designated the chairman. As the private sector's
advocate in the preparations, the FCC represents not only the
general public but also the broadcast industry, amateurs, the
electronics industry and local governments.
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) was
organized in 1922, upon invitation of the Honorable Herbert C.
Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce. T35,P« 1J Secretary Hoover
acted in response to a suggestion by the Chairman of the First
National Radio Conference, Washington D.C., that interested
government departments designate representatives to a committee
with an objective being to find means for making the most eff-
ective use of the spectrum then used by the government. The
IRAC's mission has been broadened over the years to include all
interdepartment radio matters and to advise the President with
respect to frequency assignments for the government. Figure 5
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The Federal Government has the responsibility for frequency
management, as well as establishing national objectives and
executing those policies. Its functions also involve the man-
agement, supervision, and regulation of spectrum usage to
minimize conflicts and satisfy the country's communication
requirements. As stated before this responsibility is divided
between the NTIA (Department of Commerce) for the Federal
Government and FCC for private enterprise.
The FCC and the NTIA are charged with the bulk of the prep-
aration for the 1979 WARC. The State Department represents the
United States at all ITU conferences, forwards letters to the
Chairman of the FCC, and appoints and accredits the United States
delegation to ITU conferences. The State Department also co-
ordinates United States proposals and provides regular repre-
sentation on the ITU Administrative Council. This council
carries on the working of the ITU between conferences. In
addition the State Department provides the chairmanship of the
United States National Preparatory Committee of the International
Radio Consultative Conference (CCIR).
Once conferences are completed the State Department for-
wards the International Radio Regulations to the Senate for its
advice and consent. Because the International Radio Regulations
are treaty obligations they must be ratified by a two-thirds
majority of the Senate and signed by the President.
Assisting in preparation of coordinated technical proposals
is the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) The
IRAC is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Communications and Information. The IRAC consists of 18
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Federal Agencies plus the Department of State, United States
Information Agency (USIA), military services,- National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Treasury,
and Department of Commerce. The IRAC has a permanent liaison
with the FCC, To carry out its functions the IRAC has permanent
sub-committees and forms Ad Hoc groups for special cases. Ad
Hoc 144 is doing the bulk of the preparations for the 1979 V/ARC
Ad Hoc 144 has established the following subgroups:
Ad Hoc 144-1 - Prepare for consideration by Ad Hoc 144 the
draft of U.S. positions regarding the definitions, allocations,
notification, coordination, and registration provisions of the
International Radio Regulations. The subgroup is subdivided
with regard to the services contained in the International Table
of Frequency Allocations.
Ad Hoc-144-II - Prepare for consideration by Ad Hoc 144 the
draft of U.S. positions regarding the operational and procedural
provisions of the International Radio Regulations.
Ad Hoc 144-IH - Prepare for consideration a draft regarding
technical provisions of the International Radio Regulations.
This subgroup recognizing the need for consistency of effort
has invited participation by the U.S.CCIR. Each U.S.CCIR study
group has designated representatives to Ad Hoc 144-IH to
identify technical questions which need to be addressed within
CCIR and maintain consistency in technical planning being
undertaken by both CCIR and government participants in AD Hoc 144.
Id Hoc 144- IV - Was established in early 1976 to assist in
eliminating redundant efforts among government agencies, partic-
ularly in the application of automatic data processing expanded to
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include the identification of support facilities which may be
required by the United States delegation in Washington D.C.
and the Conference site.r6if,p.32J
Ad Hoc IMf and the U.S. CCIR are charged with developing
recommended government proposals, commenting on foreign pro-
posals when available, assisting in preparation of United States
positions, and planning for United States implementation of the
final acts of the conference. "Proposals" are defined as sug-
gestions for changes in the International Radio Regulations
which the United States will forward to the ITU, while "posi-
tions" are papers the delegation will bring to the conference.
These papers will spell out for the delegates the degree of
negotiating flexibility they will have in trying to achieve the
United States proposals and positions vis-a-vis foreign
proposals.
In carrying out its responsibility the FCC has established
an internal steering committee as well as a structure of Service
Working Groups for the private sector. The FCC Office of the
Chief Engineer (OCE) is one of its major operating bureaus. The
OCE participates in all technical aspects of international tele-
communications activities. The Assistant Chief Engineer (Inter-
national and Operations Division) is responsible for OCE frequency
management activities. This office has been designated the FCC
Liaison Representative to the IRAC and works directly with the
NTIA, IRAC, and Executive Branch agencies on matters of mutual
concern, including the 1979 WARC. The NTIA also receives advice
from the Frequency Management Advisory Council (FMAC). The FMAC
is a group of private electronic industry leaders.
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The 1979 WARC agenda may contain only items determined in
advance by the ITU Administrative Council with the concurrence
of a majority of the member countries involved. This rule, in
effect for all past WARC's, has been modified for the 1979 WAEC.
A special resolution was adopted by the new majority in the ITU
that will allow the agenda for the 1979 WARC to be revised by
the participants following the opening of the conference. The
agenda items and positions on these items for the United States
are developed by the NTIA using the IPAC/FCC mechanism to coor-
dinate a unified approach. Once agreement is reached on these
items they are forwarded to the State Department for use by the
United States representative to the ITU Administrative Council.
When the State Department receives any approved agenda item
from the Administrative Council it transmits the item to the
NTIA. The NTIA then develops positions and instructions, with
IRAC/FCC participation for the United States delegation. The
NTIA conducts an exchange of "Preliminary Views" on each agenda
item through meetings with other ITU members. The FCC will issue
several "Notices of Public Inquiry" to solicit inputs from pri-
vate interests and the telecommunications industry. The NTIA/
FCC then jointly develop United States proposals, alternative
positions, and instructions for the State Department to forward
to the United States delegation. Internal to the State Depart-
ment these matters are handled by the Office of International
Communications Policy in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. This
Office is responsible for final modification of proposals to
insure conformity with United States foreign policy objectives.
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Among communication and diplomatic professionals there is
much apprehension over the current state of American policyJ57,p172j
With the deletion of the Office of Telecommunication Policy from
the Executive Office of the President and its functions shifted
to the NTIA at the Department of Commerce there is great concern
that the government's representative cannot compete effectively
with the more independent and powerful FCC. There is fear that
the interests governed by the FCC - the private telecommunications
industry - might acquire undue influence in the policy process
by which "/ARC positions and proposals are developed, and that
this could conceivably work to the detriment of United States
national interests.
The concern over apparent inaction in preparation for the
1979 WAHC reached the House of Representatives Communications
Sub-Committee of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee. P+9,P«3j They voiced fear in May 1977 that the United
States had not begun its planning early enough and was far
behind schedule. in naming delegates. Also under question was
the composition of the United States delegation and its potential
viewpoints on various positions and proposals. A number of Sub-
committee witnesses stressed the importance of including minority,
women, and non-technical representatives in the delegation in
order to increase United States sensitivity to Third World and
consumer considerations, as well as political, social and
cultural factors that government engineers and telecommunications
industry representatives might overlook or underplay.
The State Department responded that certain preparations
were already underway. Preliminary consultations with foreign
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governments on possible agenda items were in progress and
national positions for the conference were being prepared.
State Department witnesses testified that "full and serious"
considerations were being given to female and minority members
while applying the standard of "essentiality" to keep the group
as small as possible. \7 9 p. 1 5j
The Ad Hoc M+k group and its subcommittees have since been
holding meetings, and the FCC has issued Notices of Inquiry to
stimulate public discussion. 1*7, p. 1 7J The FCC notices have been
controversial, however. The Fifth Notice has been characterized
as too technical for the public to read and understand, therefore
of limited use in facilitating or encouraging public participa-
tion. Critics also charge that important questions are not
being addressed in the Inquiries.
The United States is unique in the arena of telecommunica-
tions because of its large private sector. T^J Therefore, the
United States delegation will be representing the interests of
both the public and private sector in telecommunications matters
at the 1979 7/ARC. Most other nations have publicly owned
government monopolies - usually Postal, Telephone and Telegraph
(PTT) Ministries. These ministries are able to speak with a
single voice for their governments. The foreign Governments
are thus able to formulate telecommunication policies without
particular regard to profit or the other motives that would
concern a private industry. It is the author's opinion that
this relationship of telecommunications vis-a-vis the national
Government can give foreign Governments, Western Europe, the




Internal U.S. decisions by the FCC can and do have a major
impact on worldwide telecommunications. Any FCC decision on an
American common carrier can affect the carriers foreign partner.
For example, the FCC denied the application of American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and five other United States
international common carriers to construct a new transatlantic
submarine cable. r57,p.88j This not only had an impact on A-
merican firms but also 26 European and Canadian PTT's. Foreign
Governments raise strenuous objections to a United States
Government domestic agency imposing domestic regulatory policies
on international telecommunications.
Similiar actions by the FCC have prompted the criticism that
the FCC has become involved in making foreign communications
policy. The FCC replies that, although it is not mandated to
directly impose regulatory policies outside of the United States
by the Communications Act of 1934, it must act in the "public
interest." The FCC is playing a leading role in United States
preparation for. the 1979 WARC with this view of its function.
The proposals they present, if adopted, will affect domestic
and international telecommunications. The FCC does demonstrate
an inability to recognize reality in international communica-
tions. This was evidenced by FCC Commissioner R. E. Lee's,
statement concerning the 1977 ITU Broadcasting Satellites
Conference as referenced in Chapter III section C. This at-
titude ignores the highly politicized nature of both the 197*f
and 1977 ITU Conferences. To deal effectively at the 1979 WARC
the United States must develop realistic positions taking into




This topic has been covered earlier in this paper but the
concern it is causing the United States in its preparations
merits some further discussion. The LDC's see the technical
domination of international telecommunications by the industrial
nations (led by the United States) as part of a conscious effort
to keep them in a subordinate and exploitable condition. The
Third World has plainly revealed that -this attitude is no longer
acceptable to them. At the 1974 Maritime Conference and the 1977
Broadcasting Satellite conference they demanded and received
allocations regardless of whether they could use them or not«66,6J




1. Acquisition of additional broadcasting frequencies
in high frequencies (HF).
2. Acquisition of as much of the non-broadcast fre-
quencies as possible.
As discussed previously the frequencies could be used
for barter or monetary exchange.
The challenge for the United States and the other in-
dustrial nations is the extent to which they can persuade the
Third World to modify their demands in the interest of coop-
eration in solving international telecommunications problems.
The industrial nations must be prepared to offer needed technical
assistance to get the LDC's to focus their energies on legitimate
problems instead of confrontation.
The role the Soviet Union and its satellites will play
is uncertain and a matter of deep concern. The Soviets have a
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great deal to lose if their spectrum allocations are signifi-
cantly restricted. In the view of the authors, however, the
Soviets support policies not in their direct interest to gain
the confidence of the Third World. The Soviets trade off
advantages in one area to reap benefits in more crucial areas
to meet their long term policies.
It is the authors' opinion that the United States must
respond both technically and politically. Our positions must
be those that will generate support from the majority at the
1979 WARC. The United States must make every possible attempt
to respond to legitimate Third World demands with offers of
technical assistance and cooperation in order to avoid emotional
arguments and "power" politics.
The decisions of the 1979 WARC will have a major impact
on United States international telecommunications and infor-
mation industries whether the U.S. Senate ratifies the document
or not. The impact will be felt by the communications giants
such as AT&T, United States government users such as Voice of
America, the military services, NASA, and down to and including
the AM broadcast on your car radio.) 54,p.A-
2.J
The United States efforts should be coordinated at high
Executive Branch level to insure that national security consid-
erations are taken into account, balanced by economic and tech-
nical objectives. The IRAC/FCC, Ad Hoc 1/+4 and U.S. CCIR study
groups are now preparing for the 1979 WARC. Ideally, the authors'
view is that the final delegation composition be broadly based,
made up of industry, consumers, engineering and foreign policy
specialists. Such a delegation may be able to deal better with




The primary areas where compromises are necessary are the
High Frequency band, Satellite communications and general
considerations.
A. SATELLITE SYSTEMS
This section is subdivided into two parts. First, techni-
cally sound alternatives are discussed. These alternatives,
divorced of political ramifications, are in effect an attempt
to use the periphery path of the model. This has been the
historical U.S. approach. The second part discusses the polit-
ical aspects of these alternatives. In terms of the model, these
political questions have entered the decision box without
addressing technology. It is at this junction that the technical
alternatives are modified and reshaped by the additional polit-
ical factors. The outputs are the compromise decisions.
1 • Technical Feasibility
In the area of Satellite communications the possible
proposals in the authors' view are:
a. Create exclusive bands for Fixed Satellites
and Broadcast Satellites.
b. Continued sharing of Fixed and Broadcast
Satellite bands but increased allocations.
c. No increase in allocations and bands remain
shared.
d. Creation of exclusive bands for Fixed or
Broadcast Satellites but not both.
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e. Variations of the above 4 possibilities.
Fixed Satellite service operates point to point, utilizes
high power uplinks with large and small area coverages. Intelsat
V will operate in the 11 and 14 GHz bands as will the European
Communication Satellite (ECS), while Satellite Business Systems
(SBS) will operate in the 12 and 14 GHz band, [l 1
,p.36J DOD's
new systems are in the 7 and 8 GHz bands. Other systems are
planned in many areas of this portion of spectrum. The Fixed
Satellite Service have been accommodated in their present bands
for many years supporting such vital services such as military
communications and telephone circuits. It is the opinion of the
authors that since changes in these allocations would not only
be costly in terms of dollars but also in degradation of these
vital services, the present allocations must be protected.
Satellite broadcast systems have widespread applications
in and out of government. They are, however, mostly profit
oriented systems. Additionally broadcast systems, while tech-
nically feasible now, will require a significant transition
period prior to becoming fully operational. The Broadcast
Satellite systems can also be accommodated at higher frequencies
due tc their limited coverage and higher attenuation factors.
No matter which option is selected, it is the authors'
opinion that there will be an increase in associated costs. It
is therefore better to have this increased cost used for devel-
opment of sharing techniques throughout the spectrum rather than
for wholesale band changes and subsequent losses in efficiency.
Those systems operational and presently planned (development
stages) should be protected. Future systems should be fit into
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the higher bands or around existing systems on a not to inter-
fere basis. A number of government and industry papers reviewed
for this study indicated that while not feasible in all areas
of the spectrum, sharing between Fixed and Broadcast Satellites
is feasible above 40 GHz. f53}P»3oJ With coordination on orbit
spacing this sharing could be extended below 40 GHz. This
supports the already existant need for coordination among the
Fixed systems heavily concentrated below 20 GHz.
With the recent technological advances opening higher
frequencies the Broadcast Satellite interest should be encouraged
to design systems above 40 GHz. Usually in order to be effective
Broadcast Satellites require small area footprints such as the
Japanese Islands, or the UK. At lower frequencies this requires
high gain receive antennas which are large and uneconomical, or
high power from the satellite which is also uneconomical. \32*£kkQj
The approximate relationship of gain and beamwidth is\32,p.2-3j
9 = 270OO&
Additionally gain is inversely proportional to wavelength
squared; therefore, at higher frequencies a given antenna will
have significantly increased gain and therefore a smaller
beamwidth. (double the frequency increases gain by a factor
of four and reduces beamwidth by £)« The problem of increased
power required to overcome free space losses and effects such
as rain can be solved [46, p. 1 5-6J The newest NASA transmitters
provide 200 watts of output power and mark a significant jump
in available satellite power. The power increases are being
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obtained reasonably increased costs, which if historical trends
hold true should decrease. Another significant economy that
should be mentioned is the use of the space shuttle; flZf, p. 57J
placing larger payloads (associated with higher frequency sat-
ellites) into earth orbit will be less expensive, and the
higher frequencies are better suited to Broadcast satellite
techniques, [j if, p. 58J For these reasons encouragement should be
given to placing new Broadcast systems at higher frequencies.
One possible method of coordination is a "scaling law"
system based on single and multiple protection ratios with
budgeted or targeted separation angles. This criteria would
likely be complex because of the variety of satellite systems
using geostationary orbits. (International standardization of
hardware would be costly). A better method might be a segmen-
tation technique. The two dominant factors affecting satellite
spacing are earth station gain (on axis of sattellite) and RF
signal structure resulting from different modulation methods
used. £53J The unhomogeneity resulting from differences in
on-axis gain results from the use of differently sized antennas
at the earth stations and is, in essence, caused by higher
sidelobe radiation from smaller antennas. The differences from
modulation techniques has occurred because of the mixture of
modulation methods with low ratio (5-8db) of peak power density
(PPD) to average power density (FDM/FM and some digital) with
those that have a higher (15DB) peak to average power density
(TV and single channel per carrier FM)
.
A frequency segmentation plan could be developed to reduce
the differences. Under this concept, systems with low-gain
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antennas and large ratios of peak to average power densities
would use one portion of a band while systems with high gain and
low peak to average power ratios would use another, thereby
reducing the required orbit spacing between satellites. \53, p. 27j
This segmentation requires the utilization of power density
limits. The concept is applicable to all bands, but the power
density limits would be unique to each band.
It is beyond the scope of this study to further develop
these limits other than to state that the concept is technically
viable. Additional research should be accomplished to divide
the bands and determine the cut off frequencies. Once the
division is identified, systems can be given an efficiency
rating to determine the amount of the band allocated. A possible
approach is to utilize the efficiency concepts put forth by
Leslie A. Berry of NTIA in his article MEASURING SPECTRUM USE
in WIRELESS WORLD, December 1978. (Ref. 23) His concept utilized
the equation:
-n-^-T-™,-- COMMUNICATIONS ACHIEVEDEFFICIENCY =
SPECTRUM SPACE USED
This measure, while complicated, will provide a ranking
method for systems within each service to assist planners in
blocking the systems within the proper bands.
In summary, Fixed and Broadcast Satellite allocations can
be shared. With close coordination, new systems can still be
placed in lower portions of the band utilizing an orbit seg-
mentation plan. Broadcast Satellite interests should be




The above recommendations are technically feasible, but
can they or at least a similar proposal be adopted? The
decision box is no longer transparent. As stated earlier, the
LDCs have a suspicion of Broadcast services because most of
these countries see them as a possible destabalyzing factor.
This is why they seek control of Broadcasting within their
boundaries. On the other hand they view FIXED Satellite services
as something to which they should have access. It is the authors
opinion that only the more advanced of the LDCs have a valid
need for Satellite service, but most seek it if only as a source
of national pride. As noted before they also are on record as
wanting frequencies for each service allocated by nation rather
than the present method of first come first serve. \ 61J
The authors' perception is that the political position
of the LDCs then will probably be to expand FIXED allocations,
limit Broadcast services and allocate the frequencies by nation.
It is in the U.S. interest to expand both Fixed and
Broadcast services. To achieve this, the LDCs must be convinced
that supporting increased Broadcast Bands will not be harmful
to them, not an easy task as discussed previously, the developed
countries (US particularly) and the LDCs have been at odds on
control of broadcast content for some time. There are several
possible options. One might be to allow national or at least
regional control of Broadcasting. This solution would probably
eliminate any chance for Congressional ratification of '<VARC 79
protocols and therefore is infeasible. Second, the U.S. could
fight for free access and take a reservation if controls are
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voted. This solution would allow the U.S. to follow an indepen-
dent course but would still be damaging to ratification by the
Senate. Third, the U.S. could offer assistance to certain
groups of LDC's in developing their own regional broadcast
organizations. This assistance could be a means of obtaining
these nations' support for our non-control position and drive a
wedge in the solidarity of the LDC bloc. The third solution,
we feel is the best based upon experience at recent conferences.
The LDC's, or at least a meaningful percentage of them, were
convinced not to push for controls at the 1977 WARC. Their
continued support could be gained if they were offered a mean-
ingful alternative to national control. That alternative is
the ability to make their views known in news, informational,
educational and entertainment broadcasts. This must be nego-
tiated prior to the convening of 7/ARC. In the opinion of the
authors, the best prospects are the Indonesian, Phillipine,
Maylasia, Thailand group, South American countries and the
Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Sudan,
•Jordan and Lebanon. If these countries could be convinced they
might draw a few more LDC's to the U.S. view and the national
control issue could be diffused.
Assuming the successful resolution of the control issue,
the problem of Broadcast allocations would be simpler. The
technical arguments should prevail once the political issues
are separated. The last and possibly most difficult issue will
be the allocation of these frequencies by nation.
Areas 1 and 3 have already allocated Satellite Broadcast
Frequencies by nation, and the Maritime frequencies are
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similarly allocated although the U.S. took a reservation on this
issue. It appears that given events of the recent past, national
allocations are inevitable. Support for this issue is very
strong within the LDC bloc # |6lJ The best strategy for the U.S.
will be to strike some compromise position. The technical
arguments support orbit segmentation which is really frequency
segmentation to avoid interference. One possible solution in
the authors1 opinion is a full allocation plan by nation which
will be inefficient and difficult to enforce. The solution at
the other extreme is again to fight for the status quo and take
a reservation. This would probably be a singular exercise
since even the usual U.S. supporters in region 2 support national
allocations. The best solution is in a compromise that allows
as much free access as possible and also reserves some fre-
quencies for national use. A U.S. position that allows at least
token national allocations will avoid costly confrontations
that can undermine other proposals. The proposal should allow
for some frequencies to be allocated on a technical user basis
and reserve some for each nation now capable of utilizing them.
In the opinion of the authors a third set of frequencies should
be kept in a reserved pool for other nations (LDC's) to draw
upon when needed. The actual frequencies to be allocated to
each nation should be decided at specialized regional WASC's
thus delaying the action up to 5 years. This will provide a
buffer for new design systems during any transition period
negotiated at a specialized WARC. This could force some in-
efficiencies and even increase costs due to technical factors.
The LDC's could also choose to lease their frequencies to others
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at ITU set rates. This would be another added cost, but better
than an OPEC fashioned frequency cartel that could set arbitrary
rates. The extremes could be so disastrous that the compromise
must be pushed by the U.S.
In the view of the authors, the above discussions are
a demonstration of how the allocation model could function.
Pragmatically it does not provide the optimum technical or
political solution separately. It can provide the optimal
combination if the decision forming factors are studied and
utilized. The result of the above process is an allocation
consisting of some expansion and some modification. Both, as
noted in the discussion, provide some benefits. Since the
allocation will be a compromise decision, it must be assumed
it will also have some opportunity costs that must be forgone.
The end effect is to move the model toward equilibrium in the
short term. The long term effect is not an absolute in the view
of the authors. Historical precedent should dictate a further
increase in demand over time due to the expanded usable spectrum
technology opens to new users. This could, however, be counter-
balanced by the increased costs of further modification or
expansion. In other words each time the model nears equilib-
rium it becomes more difficult to start the process again.
This opinion is drawn from the increased cost of utilizing
higher frequency segments even in the face of growing demand
rates.
The U.S. can accomplish these goals through the full
use of its political, technical and economic strength.
90

B. THE HIGH FREQUENCY BANDS
The High Frequency (HF) portion of the spectrum has been the
most popular band since its use began in the 1 920' s.l63,p. 1 1J
The present HF spectrum is, in the authors 1 view, a product of
the Allocation Model, It has evolved first by the technological
path and more recently, almost exclusively through the political
path. The need (demand) for expanded communications forced
spectrum use above 3 MHz during and after World War I. The
ability (technical and fiscal) to build such needed receivers
and transmitters was not a problem. Shortly after the conclusion
of World War II the HF spectrum range of 3 to 30 MHz was fully
allocated. The birth of new nations in Africa and Asia high-
lighted the increased demand for HF allocation while at the
same time there was limited technical expansion cabability
available. During the transition period of 1959 to 1971 the
new Third World nations organized themselves into a policy bloc
by using their power in the regulatory process to achieve their
goals. Thus their voting power in the ITU and potentially at
the 1979 WARC gives them the capability to attain through the
regulation process what they cannot afford in technological
advances. These concepts of HF usage are expanded and the WSr
Navy's position examined in this section,
1 o Technical/Political
Since World War I, when 3 MHz was used for naval com-
munications, HF has become the "workhorse" in international
and maritime communications. Advancing technology created and
encouraged the desire for additional uses faster than it pro-
duced the means to cope with the problem of demand exceeding
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supply. Anytime there is a highly desirable, limited natural
resource the competition for that resource is very intense. The
overcrowding of the HF radio spectrum becomes readily apparent
when one considers that the method used to contain the use of
HF within spectrum allocation is a voluntary adherence program
on the part of all nations to a rigid frequency and time sharing
schedule. Nearly 100 countries, employing over 1365 transmitters,
a large percentage being between 100 and 250 kilowatt (KW),
are engaged in HF international broadcasting and more countries
are demanding allocations for that purpose. r54jP«4-3J
The intolerable levels of interference and congestion in
existing HF broadcasting bands have been meticulously documented
and substantiated in that less than 35 percent of all frequencies
used are interference free.r5,p.2J Of the frequencies used by the
United States for broadcasting, approximately 50 percent are
seriously degraded by interference. Not included in this figure
are those frequencies jammed by the Soviet Union and others.
|5,P»2J To further complicate the interference problem, the
Soviet Union has scheduled the use of huge 500 O transmitters
for broadcasting purposes.
The impact of the rapid worldwide growth in uses of HF
has been felt in the following areas:
— in the increased amount of coordination and engi-
neering required to accommodate a new or expanded use, thus
greater cost;
— in greater depth of engineering studies to determine
the electromagnetic compatability with environment and side
effects of the proposed operation, thus greater cost;
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— in the need for increased application of improved
technology such as:
• smaller channel separations and equipment capable of
operating within such channels;
• highly directive antennas;
• improved methods of modulation requiring less spectrum
bandwidth and more resistant to undesired signals;
• broadband high-capacity techniques vs many narrowband
channels where spectrum will be saved;
• real-time information on high frequency propagation
conditions obtained by methods such as oblique ionospheric
sounders, to ensure use of the best frequency at all times and
get greater results from the few frequencies available.
— in the need for much more specific information on
existing operations and terrain features;
— in longer time to get an authorization;
— in longer waiting time to get a free channel when
frequencies are shared with other users; and
— in the need to accomodate some expansion of existing
and new operations, as well as to reaccommodate some existing
operations, higher in the spectrum. \3k, p.E-2J
The authors' opinion is that these purely technical
problems will require much more than the proposed technical
solutions. The representatives of the nations of the world
must give due consideration to political-economic factors or




With the enormous level of overcrowding and resulting
interference in the HF radio spectrum bands, the question is
asked, why not shift some requirements to other portions of the
spectrum? The acid test of any telecommunications system is;
will it work in the intended environment at the desired level
of efficiency without suffering degradation to performance or
adding to that of other systems operating in that same environ-
ment? The radio spectrum itself is the culprit in the problem
simply because of its nature.
As noted previously, the radio spectrum has natural
constraints. It is not limitless. The radio spectrum is not
elastic. A channel cannot be occupied in the same geographic
space by two or more users without degrading interference re-
sulting. Many tasks can only be performed in certain portions
of the spectrum. Substitution of one frequency band for another
cannot work in parts of the spectrum because of propagation
characteristics, atmospheric conditions, and bandwidth limita-
tions. The radio spectrum does not follow geographical bound-
aries; consequently, your vital information is another's radio
interference. The simple truth is that many dedicated high
frequency functions just cannot be performed in any other
frequency band.
The users of the HF radio spectrum have existed so long
with the congestion problem that they view it as a fact of life.
In response to this, users are being forced to take expensive




Prsident Truman, in February 1950, created the President's
Communication Policy Board, In creating this board he stated
that the shortage of high frequencies was, "the most pressing
communication problem at this particular time," and one that,
"is rapidly assuming major prominence," [5k, p,F-1 \\ The HF radio
has not lost any importance to the United States with the passing
of time. President Carter expressed his views on the importance
of HF in supporting foreign policy through the United States
International Broadcast by stating, "This Administration firmly
supports United States International Broadcasting as a part of
our committment to the free flow of information and ideas.
International Broadcasting is a key element of the United States
foreign policy. Communicating our policies, ideals, and tradi-
tions of free information to the peoples of the world is of
vital importance to the security of the United States and the
structure of peace," p8,p,2j
There are two dominant themes in the Federal Government
use of the radio spectrum:
1, The requirement for telecommunications is placed
upon the Federal Agencies by virtue of the missions and programs
approved by the President consistent with Congressional legis-
lative funding support, and
2, The use of radio rather than any other form of com-
munications is dictated by the inescapable elements of time
and space, |_1 ,p,5j
The depth of the United States Government involvement is




1. The total United States Government investment in
communication-electronics equipment is in the billions of dollars
(approximately 367 Billion in 1977);
2. The number of United States Government equipments
operating throughout the radio spectrum is in the millions;
3« The number of United States Government radio frequency
assignments is over 140,000, One assignment may represent
hundreds or even thousands of individual stations or equipments;
k» The variety of the Federal Agency missions that
depend on radio is innumerable.
The relationship between the basic mission of a given Agency,
the facilities needed to fulfill that mission, and the require-
ments for corresponding radio frequency spectrum space must be
recognized, for these three items are inseparable if the mission
is to be effectively accomplished. For example, military op-
erations would be at Civil War effectiveness levels without
communications-electronics equipment for all phases of support
of their mission, to protect United States interests throughout
the world.
The paramount requirement of military communications-
electronics is to provide telecommunications, navigation, and
special purpose electronic systems that are responsive to the
requirements of the National Command Authority, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, the
military services, and defense agencies in the accomplishment
of designated missions and functions in peacetime, contingency
situations at all levels of conflict, including general nuclear
warfare. Military telecommunications systems accommodate
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crisis management, facilitating a rapid transtion from peace to
war. The success of military operations is undeniably tied to
the ability to use the radio spectrum as needed.
The HF spectrum is critical to the plans of the Depart-
ment of Defense to carry out its command, control and communica-
tions (C^) functions of the tactical and strategic forces at its
disposal. The military's needs are to be satisfied while
minimizing the impact on other users through efficiently ex-
ercised management. n7,p.3J These needs are met so that the
primary uses of the radio spectrum are in accordance with the
International Radio Regulations. The secondary needs of the
services are met on a not to interfere basis.
A sound management program of resources is needed to
support a balanced and operationally effective training/con-
tingency program for the military force structure. It is only
through diligent and progressive management and technological
advancement that the radio frequency spectrum requirements,
incident to national readiness and security, can be met. Given
the foregoing, decisions made at the 1979 WARC concerning the HF
radio spectrum will determine how this spectrum region will be
used and applied through the year 2000. '.Vith the military
security of the United States at stake, the United States must
develop sound positions concerning those frequencies that are
essential, and to protect them by accommodating the legitimate
needs of other users where feasible.
2. The Navy and HF Uses
The Navy has requirements in the HF frequency band that
are in many instances unique and thus are often misunderstood
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by other users for that reason. It is the authors' view, that
given the advances in satellite communications, HF communications
are still presently the only practicable means to communicate
with deployed aircraft and ships at sea. The variation in needs
to communicate with aircraft and ships complicates the coordin-
ation processes in obtaining or retaining frequencies for such
requirements. In the past the Navy has gained little or no
sympathy from other users, nor should it expect it in the future,
for its unique problems. Cooperation could be improved if the
Navy took the initiative and the opportunity in the proper forum
to indicate to others what the unique problems that the Navy
faces in the H? bands are. This would allow other users, even
if they didn't agree with the Navy position, to at least under-
stand it.
Some specific examples of unique Navy requirements will
be discissed in the following paragraphs:
a) To prosecute an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) problem,
it is crucial that effective communications be maintained*.
Satisfying ASW needs in the HF band requires a frequency on
which ships, aircraft, coast stations, ground stations, and
sometimes land mobile and fixed stations can all communicate
with each other in a complex net. Such a net often requires one
or more types of emissions. The problem focuses on the fact that
in the IfMHz to 2514Hz region there is really no precise allocation
in the international table of frequency allocations that sat-
isfies completely these requirements. The Navy is thus forced
to improvise taking due note to select discrete assignments in
the HF band to minimize the impact on other users of the
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spectrum while meeting its committments. Such decisions could
place the ASW operation in the exclusive fixed bands making the
fixed portions "in band" but the mobile portions "out of band."
Similiarly, a frequency used in the exclusive maritime mobile
band would place the shore and ship portions "in band" but the
aircraft, land mobile and fixed portions "out of band." An
exclusive aeronautical mobile band would satisfy the ground and
air portions while the ship and fixed portions would be "out
of band." Those portions of the net operating out of band
usually are not derrogatory to the international allocation
table. This type of operation is permitted under various special
Radio Regulations which provide for exceptional use of fre-
quencies in otherwise exclusive bands.
b) A Navy broadcast requires a coast station to transmit
simultaneously to a number of deployed ships and sometimes to
another fixed receiver. The dedicated band from a table alloca-
tion standpoint is the exclusive coast telegraph bands. Con-
gection sometimes prevents these requirements from being met in
the movement of the broadcast to the exclusive fixed bands.
Again this can be done under the exceptional provisions of the
Radio Regulations.
c) Due to the unavailability of suitable exclusive coast
and ship telegraphy bands some primary ship/shore requirements
must be met in the fixed bands.
d) Due to the unavailability of suitable exclusive
aeronautical mobile bands, some primary air/ground requirements
must be met in the fixed bands.
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e) Navy ships carry an HF communication suit far more
extensive than that carried by non-Navy vessels. The suit more
resembles that of a large communications land station. A Navy
ship maintains continuous communications simultaneously on a
variety of circuits of various emission types. A Navy ship can
and sometimes must terminate with many different shore stations
of various types, distances, azimuths from the ship, and commun-
ication suits. A significant problem with Naval communications
is how to configure the antennas on ships and planes. Ships and
planes do not have the luxury of choosing large antenna farms
of optimum location and height as do shore stations. A ship's
transmit and receive antennas and equipment must of necessity
be crammed together on a small platform in an environment where
communications are a support element to the ship's main function.
This fact multiplies equipment compatibility problems between
various HF apparatus. Naval HF communications must also endure
problems created by its use of frequencies above and below the
HF band. Naval communications usually have a far greater impact
on other users than those users have on the Navy. This further
complicates the problem of obtaining suitable frequencies for
Navy ships. M7,p.2j
The Navy is expected to retain its HF broadcast capa-
bility and use it for at least the next twenty years. The
Naval Telecommunications System will need high message trans-
mission reliability with the lowest possible message trans-
mission redundancy. To improve its frequency utilization, the
Navy is planning to employ oblique ionospheric and channel
sounding systems. These "sounders" will:
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a) Improve operations employing HF and offer high
probability of selecting frequencies to support communications.
b) Provide the choice of optimum frequency in real time
and simultaneously reduce the number of on-line equipments,
c) Provide more efficient use of the radio spectrum and
lessen congestion if real time information is available to HF
communication systems, [2.7, p. 1 3J
The problem of proper frequency selection is very difficult to
program in advance due to the dynamic nature of the propagation
medium. The "sounder" systems should help considerably,
Another technical development that has the potential
for easing the HF congestion problem is a conversion to single
side band (SSB) systems, 3y using SSB technology the applicable
bands within the HF spectrum could be effectively doubled. The
conversion to SSB is a very attractive possibility, but it has
drawbacks, A SSB communications system would require both
transmitter and receiver to be SSB capable. The conversion from
conventional equipment to SSB equipment would entail significant
economic costs and transition problems. Such a measure would,
therefore, encounter strong opposition both internationally and
domestically. One only has to multiply the millions of individual
transmitters and receivers currently in operation by the dollar
cost of SSB conversion or replacement to see that the cost would
run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The high cost of new technology is one of the reasons
the lesser developed countries are demanding that the developed
countries vacate the conventional communications bands. One
would not expect that the LDC's would accept such a plan as SSB
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conversion without some form of conversion cost and technological
subsidization. The total political-economic benefits must be
weighed in the implementation of such a plan. The long term
gains in international telecommunications cooperation may merit
the short term costs to the United States and other developed
nations.
In summary, the HF region of the radio spectrum is
vital to the domestic and international communications of the
private and public interests of the United States. There are
limited gains that can be made through technology. The authors
feel that the level of information that users want to transmit
makes bandwidth reductions, beyond those gained by using SSB
techniques, impractical. The HF portion of the spectrum does
not have room for expansion, therefore in terms of the authors'
model the cost of the technological path approaches infinity
leaving the political path and re-allocation of HF resources
as the only acceptable alternative to those desiring HF services.
The United States cannot afford to be in an inferior political
negotiating position on HF issues. To continue to deliver its
views of news and politics to the rest of the world, the United
States must have dedicated International Broadcast frequencies.
In the age of potential nuclear war the HF radio spectrum plays
a crucial role in the effective command and control of strategic
and tactical forces. The Navy must have a reliable, real time
exchange of information available to commanders through all
contingencies including a loss of all satellite communications,
and general nuclear war. The Navy must maintain and continue to
develop HF point-to-point communications until satellites are
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war survivable either through technical improvement or redun-
dancy. These requirements can only be met by access to the
needed radio frequencies. To protect their interests the United
States and the Navy must develop positions which not only meet
their parochial interests but which also look realistically at
the world as a whole in economic, political, and technical terms.
C. POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS FOR FUTURE OUTCOMES
The role of world leadership came to the United States
rapidly and to some extent without conscious action by its
leaders. The United States reluctantly entered World War I«
Due to political policies by President Wilson and the isolation-
ist attitude of the country, the United States stayed out of the
League of Nations, probably dooming that organization to failure.
The isolationist spirit captivated the country through the
depression and up until December 7, 19A-1 when the United States
entered World War II.
President Roosevelt, early in the War developed the support
for the United Nations. The end of World War II saw the United
States as the only major world power that had not been ravaged
by the war. The only two nations with significant military
strength were the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus in
the space of four years the United States found itself as the
leader of the Western world, the strongest military power on
earth, and in the beginnings of the Cold War.r7,p.15J
This rapid change in the American character did not allow
time for international experience to accompany its international
power. The recovery of Japan, Germany, and Western Europe
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depended on the aid of the United States. This led to a high
spirit of cooperation among the former Allies and enemies* The
policies and desires of the United States, being tied to re-
covery, were for the most part approved by the U.S. Congress
and the recipient foreign nations.
The second World War and the desire by native peoples for
independence from their former colonial rulers also accelerated
a realignment in world politics. The world of the second half of
the twentieth century no longer consisted of four or five major
powers but of hundreds of nations demanding equal access to
political power and economic wealth.
If one member of the world community has a preponderance of
power, economic and military, that nation can force the model
to function on the peripheral path. In that case the decision
box is transparent since the leading nation has already arrived
at a decision and no other member is strong enough to challenge
it. This is the historical U.S. position. In the opinion of
the authors that position is no longer valid. The U.S.'s
proposals are challenged today by nations with economic power
approaching that of our own such as the USSR, West Germany and
Japan. Additionally they are challenged by the not so powerful
by banning together into blocs such as the Third World, group of
77. In terms of the model these challenges are viewed in two
ways, both having the same effect. In the first case challenges
by near equals are based upon technological as well as political
grounds and therefore tend to dilute the credibility of the U.S.
proposals as they enter the decision box. This dilution will
occur any time two or more proposals enter that are
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technologically opposed in any degree. The second case of the
less powerful and lesser developed nations in effect short
circuits the peripheral process by bypassing the technology
for purely political solutions. As noted previously the effect
is the same. A blockage occurs at the decision box due to
opposing proposals.
How can this blockage be removed. There are two possibil-
ities. One is withdrawal from the Union, the second is to
change the structure of the decision box by altering our
strategy toward the ITU.
The withdrawal precedent was established by the United
States withdrawal from the International Labor Organization.
The extreme politization of that body was its downfall. p7, p. 2J
Many fear the same course is being followed by the I.T.U. The
benefits of staying versus the costs of remaining a member must
be examined.
The new majority in the I.T.U. is both vocal and insistent.
Their political' existence has brought a new contemporary multi-
lateral diplomacy that painstakingly slows the diplomatic
process. Their voting power has forced an interdependence of
all parties. The feeling is that all members need each other
and therefore decision making must be a collective or consensus
process.
The frustration and problems the United States faces at
the 1979 General '.Vorld Administrative Radio Conference (GWARC)
were not present at the 1959 GWARC. Delegates from the 1959
GWARC reported optimistically that it, "provided the opportunity
to advance with representatives of other countries the position
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and point of view of the United States on international tele-
communications questions generally and to encourage full under-
standing and friendly cooperation between the participating
countries. It is believed that the collaboration between the
United States and other countries maintained the best traditions
of the I.T.U. in its long record of international cooperation
and accomplishment." |^6, p. 1 lj The same report on the 1959 con-
ference stated that a "more experienced delegation from the
developing countries would move in the direction of accomplishment
of the United States 1 objectives." Hp, p. lk\
What are the benefits of the I.T.U, that would merit such a
positive opinion? The I.T.U. performs the functions of allocat-
ing frequencies for specific purposes, establishing communica-
tions procedures to insure safety of life, providing a
registration of frequencies by user and use, and bringing to-
gether the world's telecommunications experts to solve problems
and share expertise. In addition to these technical services,
the I.T.U. provides another forum in which the United States can
utilize its superior technology and refine its international
diplomacy.
The costs of I.T.U. membership are more than just financial.
The issues are more emotional than they are technical. The
results of the 1973 Torremolinos Conference prompted the United
States' delegate to report that too much time was spent on
matters that had nothing to do with the traditional I.T.U.
role. This caused serious doubt about the, "continuing useful-
ness of the I.T.U. as an international regulatory agency for
telecommunications." ("6, p. 17j The problems experienced with
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pre-allocation of maritime frequencies at the Maritime WARC
brought the suggestion that the United States ought to, "look
for an alternative forum to resolve the kind of issues that the
I.T.U. was once attuned to handle." [V, p. i]
The new majority in the I.T.U, has shifted the emphasis
from regulating frequencies to, "the obtaining of more funds
from the major contributors to the I.T.U. ... than furtherance
of the basic purposes of the Union." [~6,p. 1 7_1 This placed further
doubt on the I.T.U.'s ability to effectively function as a
regulatory agency. Many consider the United States threats of
withdrawal more, "frustration than a serious desire to withdraw
from the I.T.U.." |6,p» 1 8j However, withdrawal by the United
States and other industrial nations is a real possibility that
the developing countries must seriously consider.
Some political observers feel that withdrawal should not be
an alternative open to the United States. Former United Nations
Ambassador Patrick Moynihan stated, "We are witnessing the
emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the
countries of the Third World. This order is already too much
developed for the United States or any other nation to think of
opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in
this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains
'in' it." [7, p, 13] Another former United Nations Ambassador, Mr.
John Scali said, "...we can seek to lead—not as the sole head-
quarters of justice and wisdom, but as one who recognizes that
new and exciting doors can be opened by many countries in an
increasingly interdependent world." [7, p. 1 4j There must be how-
ever, a bottom line to the United States spirit of cooperation.
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Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that in inter-
national organizations and agreements, "there are limits beyond
which the U.S. will not go." Hf5, p. Ill The I.T.U. isn't the only
international organizational problem the United States is now
facing." At the Law of the Sea Conference the Third World or-
ganized into the Group of 77. This group demanded that any
benefits of private mining of the oceans floor be passed on to
all nations. Under this pressure to act, the Congress passed
its own law licensing sea floor mining. Additionally, Multina-
tional corporations involved have pressured their home govern-
ments to sign mini-treaties.
What then should the U.S. do? The authors' feel that the
U.S. should remain within the I.T.U. as a member. There are,
of course, variations to this alternative. The U.S. could seek
support for its views when success is viewed possible and remain
dormant and non-committal when the outcome does not appear to
be successful. Of course this is really where the U.S. is
today. Without any real power or "national will" to defend our
interests, the U.S. tends to play the odds by presenting its
proposals, withdrawing anything offensive, and finally con-
sidering itself successful to sustain minor losses or the
"status quo". As described earlier in Chapter III the LDCs
are becoming a strong political force. If the framework remains
the same along with our strategy then it is only a matter of
time before the U.S. will begin to feel a frequency pinch.
The role of International organizations in International
relations is to create an atmosphere which tends to view nations
and their political leaders as being capable of learning new
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behavior patterns and eventually, on an evolutionary basis, of
surrendering at least part of their sovereignty to international
cooperative efforts in order to rationalize their relationships
among one another, \3k 9 P. 9j Unlike international law, which is
more heavily based on natural law morality and traditional
concepts of state, theories of international organization, while
heavily indebted to these earlier concepts, have tended to rely
more on premises based on psychological and sociological motiva-
tions and functions. Do the international organizations of the
present meet these definitions? Partially. The cooperative
atmosphere is created by bringing nations together in a hall
rather than on a battle field, and some organizations in the past
have demonstrated the evolutionary process noted above
•\_5k,V»9J
The problem is, however, that all members of an organization are
not at equal positions in this evolutionary process, therefore
each member brings different goals and negotiating abilities
to the organization. Countries that have belonged to these
organizations for many years usually are willing to compromise
some of their own interests in order to attain a greater common
good among other long time members. The lesser developed
countries, in the authors' opinion, being more recent on the
scene have not reached this evolutionary stage and therefore
utilize the forum for their own interests rather than a common
good. Of course "common good", just as beauty, is in the eye
of the beholder. The point is that the older developed nations,
confident of their position, are more willing to cooperate in
mutual efforts than are the Third World nations.
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International organizations are of two types. The "welfare"
type and the "quasi-commercial" type. The difference is that
"welfare" systems operate primarily through political decisions
while the "commercial" type puts prime importance on the financial
implications. J34, p. 158J The I.T.U. is in the former category and
INTELSAT is an example of the latter. The evolutionary process
cited above will carry an organization from the former to the
latter by first equalizing the welfare goals of members, thus
allowing future deliberations to be on a cost/benefit basis.
Of course some organizations by-pass the first stage by having
members with already agreed upon welfare goals. The I.T.U. is
not one of these.
It is therefore necessary to equalize the welfare goals of
I.T.U. members through some organizational structure before that
organization can operate effectively. The U.N. is a prime ex-
ample of an organization that has been unable to do this,
primarily because its members are so diverse in their needs and
desires. The I.T.U. also suffers from this symptom.
If the needs and desires of a region are studied, however,
the individual national desires become blurred and the welfare
goals of geographic regions of the world tend to edge toward
equalization. In other words the needs of say Asia are not that
much different than those of a North/Central American region.
Both contain needs of developed and lesser developed nations
that can be somewhat submerged under the regions overall welfare
goals.
The proposed structural changes in the I.T.U. therefore
are that regional sub-I.T.U.'s be formed to equalize their goals.
no

The conflicts that are presently utilizing so much energy in a
world wide body could be internalized to regions prior to arriv-
ing at a global consensus. On a regional basis political hos-
tilities would be reduced due to interdependencies. Once this
regionalization of welfare goals is accomplished the evolutionary
step to a cost/benefit "quasi-commercial" organization is attain-
able through pooling of resources and regional economic assist-
ance. Compromises are easier due to the ability of developed
nations within a region to assist the LDC's in attaining a more
efficient use of spectrum and improved national welfare.
Some so called natural regional groupings exist now, such as
Africa and the Middle East, on a racial or cultural basis. The
great difficulty in accomplishing a workable regional plan is
that it will probably have to be done through a WARC. It is
therefore possible that the very thing the regional plan solves
will be the primary stumbling block to implementation.
Because of this possibility it is imperative that bilateral
and some multilateral negotiations be carried on with selected
countries throughout the world. Which countries the U.S.
chooses to negotiate with will be decided by their stature within
their regions. At the writing of this paper the list would
include China, Japan and India in Asia; Sygpt and Saudi Arabia
in the Middle East, Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya in Africa,
Great Britain, West Germany and France in Europe; Brazil,
Venezuela and Argentina in South America and; Canada and Mexico
in North/Central America. This list is not all inclusive and
is only cited as an example of the size of the task. The U.S.
presently conducts bilateral discussions prior to a '.VARC as a
1 1 1

normal part of its preparations. These discussions should
provide a starting point for negotiating informal agreements
concerning regionalization concepts. But we must be prepared
to try and accommodate other countries requirements. Unless
we are prepared to do this, such negotiations would give the
appearance of a sham and could do more harm than good. [6 1J To
be successful these negotiations must also not be limited to
telecommunications matters only but should cover other associated
economic issues such as systems development and equipment sales.
The U.S. has much to offer in return for cooperation. We should
use it.
Assuming the above regional plan is attainable, it is the
authors' position tha"c the next step is the creation of a fre-
quency market where the regions interplay their needs. The
final character of this "quasi-commercial" I.T.U. is beyond the
scope of this paper and therefore only a few possibilities are
listed here. [26,p.86j
1
. FREELY TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS
Rights created by the International body, whether
through inclusion or exclusion, are freely transferable,
with spectrum bought and sold outright. Secondary transfers




Set user charges by service and frequency.
3. CHARGES TO USERS
Charges applied on spectrum occupied by a user, as




Prices derived from maximum sums that current spectrum
users would be willing to pay; rather than do without some
amount of spectrum.
The above alternatives are only briefly mentioned to provide
a starting point for further research in this area to find an
optimal method in terms of economic and political benefits.
The above paragraphs provide a method for amending the
ITU's structure so that it will become more functional and less
political. This metamorphis is in itself a political process.
As noted earlier the second avenue open to the U.S. in remaining
within the union is a change in strategy toward the organization.
In the opinion of the authors, the United States must
develop a new method of political action. As it cannot be the
world's policeman neither can it be the world's checkbook. It
is the viewpoint of the authors that the United States should
tie its technologically strong positions, such as telecommuni-
cations, and its. capital financing strengths to the trade of
resources held by other nations. In effect use the "Common
Heritage of Man" philosophy for our benefit. The U.S. should
not separate the areas where it is strong from the areas where
it is weak. The U.S. must recognize its strengths as a major
source of technology and capital, and use these assets of power.
The U.S. should seek out those nations with legitimate com-
munication needs and arrange an exchange of technological and




The U.S. should not withdraw from the I.T.U. but should
fight politics with politics. A new strategy must be developed.
Such a strategy will not be effective, however, if the U.S.
continues its past pattern of last minute uncoordinated prepara-
tions for I.T.U. and other international conferences. There
must be a high level, precise policy to follow.
The U.S. should be prepared to meet some of the legitimate
needs of the Third World, but not alone. All the developed
countries must pay part of the price of the new politics. The
ITU as a whole must pay the price of learning how to work to-
gether. No nation's policies in the ITU will be accepted because
of power, extent of telecommunications systems, or even logic.
It may not sound popular but the term "power politics" is still






The radio frequency spectrum is controlled both inter-
nationally and domestically. Management of the spectrum on the
domestic front is accomplished primarily through the FCC,
Commerce and Defense Departments* The workings and relationships
of this domestic management are complex they are however, only
tangentially relevant to this paper and therefore will be
treated only in relation to their effect on the International
Radio Spectrum management issue* On the international side,
"i;he primary player is the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU). Born at Madrid in 1932, the Union has grown from
78 to 154 member nations and has become a recognized organ of
the United Nations. As the world's supreme forum for telecom-
munications matters, the Union reviews and passes judgement on
frequency spectrum allocations.
The ITU's mission, according to its charter is to:
1. Maintain and extend international cooperation for
telecommunications of all kinds.
2. Promote the development of technical facilities with
a view toward improving the efficiency of telecommun-
ications services, and insofar as possible, making
them available to the public, and
3. Harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
J
5A- ,p.C-1 5 I
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In particular, the Union (a) effects the allocation of the
radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency
assignments in order to avoid harmful interference between
radio stations of different countries; (b) coordinates efforts
to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of
different countries and improve the use made of the radio spec-
trum; (c) fosters collaboration among its members with a view to
the establishment of rates at levels as low as possible con-
sistent with an efficient service and taking into account the
necessity for maintaining independent financial administration
of telecommunications on a sound basis; (d) fosters the creation,
development and improvement of telecommunications equipment and
networks in new or developing countries by every means at its
disposal, especially in participation in the appropriate programs
of the United Nations; (e) promotes the adoption of measures for
ensuring the safety of life through the cooperation of tele-
communications services; and (f) undertakes studies, makes
regulations, adopts resolutions, formulates recommendations and
opinions, and collects and publishes information concerning
telecommunications matters for the benefit of all members. 54>pC-1
5
As its membership has grown, so has the Union's bureaucracy.
The present structure of the Union consists of:
a. The Plenipotentiary Conference
b. Administrative Conferences
c. The Administrative Council
d. Permanent organs of the Union
1. the General Secretariat
2. the International Frequency Registration 3oard(IPP3)
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3. the International Radio Consultative Committee(CCIR)
4» the International Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee (CCITT)
A. THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE
The Plenipotentiary Conference, which normally meets every
five years, is composed of delegations representing members.
Such conferences determine the general policies of the Union,
review reports of the Administrative Council, establish the basis
for the budget of the Union, elect the members of the Union
which are to serve on the Administrative Council as well as the
Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, and revise the
convention as considered necessary. Additionally, the
Plenipoteniary Conference concludes or revises as necessary,
agreements between the Union and other individual organizations.
3. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
Administrative Conferences may be either world administrative
or regional administrative conferences. Such conferences are
convened to consider international telecommunications matters.
The agenda of a world administrative conference may include the
revision of the Administrative Regulations as well as other
questions of world character within the competence of the con-
ference. The International Radio Regulations stem from decisions
of '.Vorld Administrative Radio Conferences.
C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL
The Administrative Council, consisting of 36 members of the
Union chosen with due regard for equitable representation of all
parts of the world, meets annually and acts for the Plenipotentiary




The Secretary-General directs the General Secretariat and
is responsible to the Administrative Council for the adminis-
trative and financial aspects of the Union's activity. It also
coordinates the activities of the permanent organs of the Union,
organizes the work of the General Secretariat, and undertakes
the secretarial work prior to, during, and following conferences
of the Union, It then prepares an annual report on the activ-
ities of the Union which, after approval by the Administrative
Council, is transmitted to all members.
E. TEE INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCY REGISTRATION BOARD
The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) effects
the orderly recording of frequency assignments made by the
different countries so as to establish, in accordance with the
procedure provided for the Radio Regulations, the date, purpose
and technical characteristics of each of these assignments. The
IFRB performs this function with a view to ensuring formal
international recognition to assignments, furnishing advice to
members with a view to the operation of the maximum practical
number of radio channels in those parts of the spectrum where
harmful interference may occur; and performing such additional
duties concerned with the assignment and use of the frequencies
as may be prescribed by a competent conference of the Union or
by the Administrative Council with the consent of the majority
of the members. The maintenance of essential records is inherent
to the performance of these duties.
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F. THE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES
The roles of the International Consultative Committees (CCI's)
are essentially:
a. International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR)-studies
technical and operational questions relating specifically to
radio communication and issues recommendations thereon;
b. International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT)-studies technical, operating, and tariff
questions relating to telegraphy and telephony and issues
recommendaiions thereon. |_5^-,p.C-18]
Recommendations of the CCI's Plenary Assemblies, when adopted
by Administrative Conferences, become part of the International
Regulations. The structure of the International Telecommunica-
tions Union is depicted in Figure 6.
An examination of the nature of the organization may give an
indication of what any member can realistically hope to achieve
in the ITU. Being an international organization, the ITU is
made up of delegates with all the strengths, weaknesses, cul-
tural and political differences of their individual and national
backgrounds. The ITU like the U.N. provides a forum for the
discussion and possible resolution of common problems. No
agreement reached by the ITU is binding on members without their
consent. In the United States the agreements carry treaty
status and must receive the consent of two-thirds of the Senate
for acceptance.
Once a proposal has been put forth member nations have the
option of participating in the debate or withdrawing (usually a




































































1) not to sign the final document.
2) sign with reservations.
3) ratify with reservations.
k) refuse to ratify.
5) ratify as presented.
The non-enforcing nature of the ITU decisions and policies
was in previous years frustrating to the United States when we
held influence over the majority. [7, p. 6] Now that the United
States often finds itself in the minority, the non-binding
nature of the rules allows - the evasion of unpopular policies
not perceived to be in U.S. national interests.
At the Montreux Conference of 1965 a resolution was proposed
that would establish a special ITU Technical Assistance Fund over
and above aid provided through the United Nations Development
Fund. The motion was defeated at Montreux but was reintroduced
and approved at Torremolinos in 1973 despite an announcement by
the U.S. that it would refuse to contribute any amount. Other
assistance resolutions passed at Torremolinos were:
1) Resolution 17, Improvement of Union Facilities for
Rendering Technical Assistance to Developing Countries,
2) Resolution 18, Application of Science and Technology in
the interest of Developing Countries,
3) Resolution 19, Special Measures for the least-developed
Countries, and




These trends continued until the present one country one
vote organization evolved. The contributory scheme is at present
heavily weighted against the Developed Nations while the provided
assistance is predominantly aimed at the developing nations. [6, p13J
For frequency allocation purposes the ITU has divided the
World into three regions. These divisions allow for the dup-
lication of frequency use to meet differing requirements in far
reaching areas. Region one comprises the eastern Atlantic, all
of Europe, Africa, Russia and the Middle East. Region two
includes North America, South America and Greenland, Region
three is made up of the remainder of the world, including Japan,
China, Australia, most of Asia and the Indian sub continent.
Within each of these regions, frequencies are allocated to
services. These services are : Hf6,p. 1-2~J
1. FIXED radio point-to-point communications such as micro-
wave links and HF circuits between dedicated points. Communica-
tion Station circuits to the shore command and much of the
Defense Communications System fall in this category.
2. Mobile radio communications between mobile units and
between mobile and fixed stations. These circuits may be used
by land, sea or air mobile units.
3. Aeronautical Mobile : Radio communications between an
aircraft and ground station or between aircraft.
if. Maritime Mobile radio communications between ships and
also ship to shore.
5. Land Mobile radio communications between a fixed base
station and mobile land units or between mobile land units.
Police, fire and taxi services are included in this category.
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6. Radio Navigation position determining circuits that
utilize the propagation characteristics of radio waves. This
category includes navigation beacons, LORAN and OMEGA.
?• Aeronautical Radio Navigation radio navigation services
intended for the use of aircraft. Examples are TACAN and air-
port aero radio beacons.
8. Maritime Radio Navigation radio services intended as
navigation aids to ships such as coastal beacons and shipboard
radars.
9. Radio location systems used for position determination
other than navigation. Included in this category are shore
radar installations, early warning radar systems and fire control
radars for weapons systems.
10. Broadcasting radio communications intended for direct
reception by the general public. Commercial radio and television
come under this heading.
11. Amateur radio communications by and for persons inter-
ested in radio techniques solely as a personal interest. This
includes non-commercial amateur radio circuits.
12. Space radio communications between space vehicles. The
lunar module communications with the mother ship were part of
this service as will be any direct satellite to satellite relays.
13. Earth-Space radio communications between earth stations
and space stations. This category includes the Navy satellite
to ship systems.
1k. Radio Astronomy radio wave propagation used for the




15» Standard Frequency radio wave transmission of high
precision and accuracy used for technical and scientific purposes,
The ITU regulations concerning frequency allocations also
specify required bandwidths, frequency tolerances, maximum power
output and type of emission.
The required bandwidth is defined as the bandwidth necessary
for the optimum efficient transmission of radio signals at rates
and quality required for the specified system. Frequency toler-
ances are the maximum permissible departure by the center fre-
quency of the frequency band occupied by an emission from the
assigned frequency or, by the characteristic frequency of an
emission from the reference frequency. The power output is
defined as the mean power. That is the power supplied to the
antenna transmission line by a transmitter during normal opera-
tion over a time period of sufficient length. A time of .1
seconds is normally used.
Emissions are defined as the type signal being transmitted.
Those include the characteristics of the signal such as radio-
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